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IDEOLOGY AND EN BANC REVIEW
MICHAEL E. SOLIMINEt
En banc decision making has existed in the federal circuit courts of
appeals for nearly fifty years. Recently the process has become the focus
of attention because it is being used more frequently and allegedly for
political purposes. In this Article, Professor Solimine examines the
evolution of the en banc process and its costs and benefits. He concludes
that legitimate concerns exist concerning courts' use of en banc decision
making that best can be addressed by developing objective criteria on
which to make the decision to invoke an en banc hearing. Professor
Solimine presents suggested criteria that focus on the goal of using the
process to address and resolve conflicts in an area of the law and not on
a goal of correcting a perceived erroneous judicial decision. Professor
Solimine then applies his criteria to en banc decisions rendered between
1985 and 1987 and draws two conclusions. First, his study refutes the
belief that Reagan-appointed judges in particular are guilty ofpoliticiz-
ing the en banc process. Nonetheless, his study demonstrates that the
courts are invoking en banc decision making in cases that do not deserve
this treatment. Professor Solimine concludes that circuit courts must
develop and use objective criteria to determine whether to en banc a case
to protect the role and process of en banc decision making.
I. INTRODUCTION
The en bane' decision making procedures of the United States Courts of
Appeals seem unlikely candidates for controversy. Normally courts of appeals
sit and decide cases in three-judge panels, the decisions of which are deemed to
be those of the entire court. 2 On rare occasions, however, amounting to less
t Assistant Professor, University of Cincinnati College of Law. B.A., Wright State Univer-
sity (1978); J.D., Northwestern University (1981). I would like to thank the following for sharing
their thoughts on en bane review with me: Judges Pierce Lively, Nathaniel R. Jones, David A.
Nelson, Richard A. Posner, and Frank H. Easterbrook; John P. Hehman, Clerk of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; the participants in a University of Cincinnati College of Law
faculty seminar; and Professors Robert J. Martineau, James L. Walker, and Jon Entin. They do not
necessarily share my opinions on the topic. Thanks also to Marjorie B. Waskewich, Appeals Pro-
gram Analyst, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, for providing me with unpublished
data, and my research assistants, Joseph Kinlin, Kurt Lindower, Michael Penn, and Brian Thomas.
This paper was presented at a faculty workshop at Case Western Reserve Law School in October
1988.
Copyright 1988 by Michael E. Solimine.
1. "En bane" means "in the bench." Note, En Bane Review in Federal Circuit Courts: A
Reassessment, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1637, 1637 n.l (1974) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 619
(rev. 4th ed. 1968)) [hereinafter MICH. Note]. Since both the relevant statute and rule, see infra
notes 2 & 4, refer to "in" rather than "en" bane, some writers prefer to use the former version. Eg.,
Comment, In Bane Procedures in the United States Courts of Appeals, 43 FORDHAM L. REv. 401,
401 n. 1 (1974) [hereinafter FORDHAM Comment]. However, given its prevalence in the case law and
literature, this Article will use the latter convention.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 46 (1982); see infra note 22.
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than one percent of cases decided on the merits,3 all of the judges sitting on the
court hear cases en bane. These occasions are supposed to be limited to cases
resolving intracircuit conflicts between panel opinions or to cases deciding ques-
tions "of exceptional importance."
'4
Despite the relative paucity of en bane decisions, the procedure has come
under increasing scrutiny and criticism in the past several years. Two circum-
stances account for this focus on en bane proceedings. The first is the large
increase in the federal appellate case load. As it is, federal judges and their staffs
are busy enough reading briefs, hearing oral arguments, and writing opinions in
the panel process. The en bane process requires the judiciary to engage in an-
other round of written and sometimes oral argument from the litigants. The
process places additional burdens on all circuit judges to review the briefs, col-
legially reach a decision, and write an opinion or opinions. This may result in
substantially delaying disposition of cases, undermining the finality of panel de-
cisions, and displacing resources which would otherwise be devoted to non-en
bane cases on the appellate court docket. For these reasons alone, some advo-
cate severe curtailment of the en bane procedure.
5
A second circumstance, the recent shift in composition of the courts, has
focused attention on the purported motivations and strategic behavior of the
appellate judges deciding cases en bane. Normally a panel decision is subject to
en bane review when a majority of eligible circuit judges so votes.6 This process
has now been linked to the ideology of judges appointed during the Reagan Ad-
ministration who, by the end of the Reagan Presidency, will account for almost
one-half of the federal appellate judiciary.7 By many popular accounts these
judges were appointed to serve the Reagan Administration's conservative social
and political agenda.8 Indeed, this perception received powerful expression dur-
ing the period of the doomed Supreme Court nominations of Judges Robert H.
Bork and Douglas H. Ginsburg in 1987.
Bork, Ginsburg, and other Reagan-appointed appellate jurists were said to
be using the en bane procedure to review and reverse panel decisions by other,
more liberal judges. Merely because they disagreed with the results reached by
3. See infra text accompanying footnotes 68-73.
4. FED. R. APP. P. 35(a); see infra note 26. Under FED. R. APP. P. 35(c) & 40(a) litigants
have 14 days after a panel decision judgement is entered in which to file an en banc petition. See also
infra note 27 (not all en bancs involve panel decisions).
5. E.g., Kaufman, Do the Costs of the En Banc Proceeding Outweigh its Advantages?, 69 JUDI-
CATURE 7, 57 (1985) (limiting use to "rarest circumstances").
6. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1982); Fed. R. App. P. 35(a).
7. Goldman, Reagan's Second Term Judicial Appointments: The Battle at Midway, 70 JUDI-
CATURE 324, 325 (1987); Wermiel, Full-Court Review of Panel Rulings Becomes Tool Often Used by
Reagan Judges Aiming to Mold Law, Wall St. J., March 22, 1988, at 70, col. 1 (as of March 1988,
Reagan had appointed 78 of 168 federal appellate judges). But see Bethell, Reagan's Other Stalled
Judgeships, Wall St. J., Dec. 2, 1987, at 28, col. 4 (predicting difficulty in confirming nominees in last
year of Administration).
8. See H. SCHWARTZ7, PACKING THE COURTS: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO RE-
WRITE THE CONSTITUTION 3-9 (1988); Note, All the President's Men? A Study of Ronald Reagan's
Appointments to the U.S. Court of Appeals, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 766, 766-70 (1987) (surveying ac-
counts in the popular press) [hereinafter COLUM. Note]; Coyle, The Judiciary: A Great Right Hope,
Nat'l L.J., April 18, 1988, at 22.
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panels comprising of or dominated by more liberal judges, Reagan-appointed
judges were said to be voting indiscriminately for en bane consideration of those
decisions.9 This controversy over en bane decision making was highlighted in a
remarkable series of opinions from the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in 1987. At the time of the opinions, that Circuit consisted
of eleven active judges: six appointed by President Reagan (including Bork and
Ginsburg), and the balance by Presidents Carter and Johnson. Three decisions
had been rendered by panels composed of or dominated by Carter- and Johnson-
appointed judges, 10 and each was voted to be reheard en banc by six to five
courts, along strict appointive lines.
Some time later, Judge Laurence Silberman, a Reagan appointee, changed
his vote to rehear the cases en bane, and the change resulted in reinstatement of
the panel decisions."1 The other Reagan appointees, now in dissent, issued a
statement arguing that en banc hearings were necessary because the panel deci-
sions were "clearly wrong" or "at the very least, highly dubious." 12 Judge
Harry T. Edwards, a Carter appointee, issued a statement criticizing the dissent-
ers' criteria for en bane review as "self-serving and result-oriented."
13 Implicit
9. See Wermiel, supra note 7, at 70, col. 2; see also Response Prepared to White House Analysis
of Judge Bork's Record (Biden Report), reprinted in 9 CARDOZO L. REv. 219, 243-44 (1987) (re-
printed from Senate Judiciary Committee Consultants, Biden Report, Sept. 2, 1987) (noting Judge
Bork's dissent from the District of Columbia Circuit's vacatur of en bane rehearings, see discussion
infra text accompanying notes 10-16); Pear & Gerth, Court Choice in Focus: A Portrait of Ginsburg,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1987, at 34, col. 6 (same analysis for Judge Ginsburg). But see A Response to
the Critics of Judge Robert H. Bork, 9 CARDOZO L. REv. 373, 386-87 (1987) (reprinted from United
States Department of Justice-Office of Public Affairs, 1987) (criticizing focus on Judge Bork's en
bane behavior, because views expressed in dissent from denial of rehearing en bane "are of necessity
tentative"). The en bane process also seems to be gaining greater attention in the press. Kg., 9th
Circuit to Rehear Gay Rights Case, Nat'l L.J., June 20, 1988, at 6 (commenting on Watkins v. United
States Army, 847 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1988) (order granting rehearing en bane)).
10. The three panel decisions were: United States v. Meyer, 810 F.2d 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (3-
0 decision; dismissal of information not proper upon a finding of vindictive prosecution), vacated &
reh'g en banc granted, 816 F.2d 695 (per curiam), opinion vacated & rehg en bane order vacated, 824
F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam en bane), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1121 (1988); Martin v. D.C.
Metro Police Dep't, 812 F.2d 1425 (2-1; summary judgment on issue of immunity inappropriate
until plaintiff has opportunity to conduct limited discovery to support claim of unconstitutional
motive), vacated in part & reh'g en bane granted, 817 F.2d 144 (per curiam), vacated & opinion
reinstated & reh'g en bane order vacated, 824 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam en bane);
Bartlett ex rel Neuman v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 695 (2-1; limiting judicial review of constitutional ques-
tions under the Medicare Act), reh'g en bane granted, order of June 8, 1987 reinstated & reh'g en
bane vacated, 824 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam en bane). Review of one of the cases,
United States v. Meyer, Was subsequently denied by the Supreme Court.
11. Statements on the vacation of the en bane rehearings are published at 824 F.2d 1240 (D.C.
Cir. 1987). As Judge Silberman observed, the D.C. Circuit on the same day vacated a decision to
rehear a fourth case en bane, though no vote was recorded and no concurring or dissenting state-
ments were issued. Meyer, 108 S. Ct. at 1246; see Mississippi Indus. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 808 F.2d 1525 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g en bane vacated, 822 F.2d 1103 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 500 (1987). For more recent examples of opinions joined by all judges appointed by
Democratic presidents, see Hammon v. Barry, 841 F.2d 426, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Mikva, J., joined
by Wald, C.J., Robinson, R. Ginsburg, & Edwards, JJ., dissenting from order vacating previous
order granting rehearing en bane); Center for Auto Safety v. Thomas, 847 F.2d 843, 844 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (en bane) (same judges issuing statement on equally divided vote); Inmates of Occoguan v.
Barry, 850 F.2d 796, 796 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (same judges dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane).
12. 824 F.2d at 1247 (dissenting statement filed by Bork, Starr, Buckley, Williams & D. Gins-
burg, JJ.).
13. Id. at 1242 (Edwards, J., concurring, joined by Wald, C.J., Robinson, Mikva & R. Gins-
burg, JJ.).
1988]
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in their criteria, Judge Edwards continued, was the "view that every time a ma-
jority of the judges disagree[s] with a panel decision, they should get rid of it by
rehearing the case en banc."'14 For his part Judge Silberman readily acknowl-
edged that he "reconsidered his views" and was "now inclined to favor en banc
only in cases of exceptional importance to this Circuit."'5 Pointing to the "in-
creasing number of cases designated for en banc rehearing and the considerable
strain those cases place, directly and indirectly, on the functioning of the court,"
he said there was "nothing unusual or improper in the court's reassessment of its
en banc caseload."'
16
The infighting revealed in the District of Columbia Circuit's opinions thus
neatly encapsulates the prevailing criticism of en bane review. The allegation
that the en bane procedure unnecessarily drains appellate court resources and
improperly allows a politicized majority of a circuit court of appeals to wreak
havoc on the usual process of delegating work and according finality to panel
decisions subsumes a number of important issues. Are en bane decisions in fact
increasing and unduly absorbing appellate court resources? What cases, if any,
are appropriate for en bane review? More fundamentally, what is improper
about a majority of a circuit court en bancing a panel opinion it concludes was
wrongly decided? Finally, is there any evidence that Reagan-appointed judges
are voting to en bane cases in any systematic way to overturn "liberal" panel
opinions?
This Article explores these questions. Part II of the Article begins by
describing the evolution of en bane decision making since it received Supreme
Court sanction in the 1940s. That section demonstrates that many of the con-
cerns expressed today over en bane reviews have parallels in earlier decades,
albeit in less virulent form. Part II then evaluates the costs and benefits of en
bane proceedings, stressing data outlining the relationship between the federal
appellate caseload and the number of en bane decisions, and of the number of
suggestions for rehearing en bane filed by litigants. Next, on a more theoretical
level, Part II explores the alleged politicization of the en bane process and sug-
gests that a circuit court majority's decision to en bane a panel opinion it thinks
14. Id. at 1243. For Judge Edwards' earlier views on the subject, see Jolly v. Listerman, 675
F.2d 1308, 1314 (D.C. Cir.) (Edwards, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane) (en bane
justified due to "miscarriage of justice" and "extreme misapplication of the law"), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1037 (1982).
15. 824 F.2d at 1246 (Silberman, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
16. Id. Judge Silberman is not alone among the Reagan-appointed judges in questioning the
appropriateness of granting en bane review. See Rakovich v. Wade, 850 F.2d 1179, 1180 (7th Cir.
1987) (Ripple, J., dissenting from granting hearing en bane) ("Certainly, no member of the court
believes, I hope, that an en bane proceeding may be used as a vehicle to permit judges to further their
own ideological predilections.").
The recent en banc voting behavior of D.C. Circuit judges has been attributed to the "ideology"
of the particular judges. See, eg., Pierce, Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on
the D.C Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DuKE L.J. 300; Carter, After
Bork A Rift Widens, Nat'l L.J., March 28, 1988, p.1 . However, D.C. Circuit judges have disagreed
in the past on the propriety of en bancing cases. Compare Jolly, 675 F.2d at 1310-11 (Robinson, C.J.
& R. Ginsburg, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en bane) with id. at 1313-14 (Edwards, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1037 (1982); see also Church of
Scientology v. Foley, 640 F.2d 1335, 1336-42 (D.C. Cir.) (Robinson, Edwards & R. Ginsburg, JJ.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981).
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wrongly decided is not necessarily improper. Nevertheless, it acknowledges that
en bancing cases solely for "political" or personal preferences is indefensible,
and that appellate judges ought to follow some objective criteria in deciding to
invoke an en bane hearing. Part II of the Article concludes by formulating such
criteria, which aim to flesh out the accepted standard that en bancs are only to
resolve intracircuit conflicts or issues of particular importance.
Part III of the Article is devoted to an empirical study of recent en bane
decision making. The en bane opinions for the years 1985, 1986, and 1987 are
examined and, applying the suggested criteria, the study concludes that over
one-half of the cases should not have been decided by the full court. Moreover,
the study reveals little evidence of ideological bloc-voting by judges in these
cases. The study finds only a handful of cases in which Reagan-appointed judges
alone provided the votes necessary to overturn a disfavored panel decision.
Given the large number of unanimous en bane cases, all en bane decisions are
noteworthy for the absence of strict party or politically based voting behavior.
Nevertheless, the large number of cases unworthy of en bane treatment also
suggests that most circuits need to address seriously the criteria they use to de-
cide whether to en bane a panel decision.
II. BACKGROUND AND PRESENT STATUS OF EN BANC DECISION MAKING
A. Evolution
The development of the en bane procedure in federal courts of appeals has
been discussed in other sources and need only be outlined here.17 The propriety
of en bancing a circuit decision first arose in the 1930s as a conflict between the
Ninth and Third Circuits.1 8 In 1941 the Supreme Court resolved the conflict in
17. See generally R. MARTINEAU, MODERN APPELLATE PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND STATE
CIVIL APPEALS 249-51 (1983); C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 11 (4th ed. 1983); 13 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3506 at 23-24 (1984);
Maris, Hearing and Rehearing Cases in Banc, 14 F.R.D. 91 (1954); FORDHAM Comment, supra note
1, at 402-05; MICH. Note, supra note 1, at 1639-43 (historical overview); Note, En Banc Hearings in
the Federal Courts of Appeaks Accommodating Institutional Responsibilities, 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 563,
569-74 (1965) (historical overview) [hereinafter N.Y.U. Note].
Two issues not addressed by this Article are worth mentioning. First, use of panel and en bane
decisions in state appellate courts will not be discussed. On that topic, see N.Y.U. Note, supra, at
565-67; Overton, A Prescription for the Appellate Caseload Explosion, 12 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 205,
213 (1984). Second, this Article will not address certain technicalities concerning whether and to
what extent appellate judges of senior status can vote to rehear cases en bane and participate in the
rehearing, and what vote is necessary if judges disqualify themselves. See, eg., Arnold v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc., 712 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1983) (en bane) (effect of recusal of judges), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1040 (1984); FORDHAM Comment, supra note 1, at 404 n.30 (which judges can vote). These
issues have been largely mooted by statutory amendment, see Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 205, 96 Stat. 25, 53, (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1982)) (permitting
senior status judges to participate in rehearings when judge was member of the panel), and individ-
ual circuit rules. Eg., 7TH CIR. INT. Op. P. 5(d)(1) (stating that recused judge is excluded from the
count to determine whether a majority of non-recused judges have voted to rehear en bane). But see
United States v. Nixon, 827 F.2d 1019, 1021-22 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (denying rehearing en
bane) (noting split among circuits on disqualification issue), cerL denied, 108 S. Ct. 749 (1988). See
generally Note, Playing With Numbers: Determining the Majority of Judges Required to Grant En
Banc Sittings in the United States Courts of Appeals, 70 VA. L. REv. 1505 (1984) (outlines intercir-
cuit conflict about the number of judges required to grant an en bane hearing).
18. Compare Lang's Estate v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d 867, 869 (9th Cir.) (Judiciary Act of
1988]
NOR TH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Textile Mills Securities Corporation v. Commissioner,19 holding that courts of
appeals have inherent power to decide cases en banc. 20 Congress essentially
codified the Textile Mills decision in 1948 by enacting Judicial Code section
46(C). 21 The provision, as amended, states that cases shall be heard and decided
by three-judge panels, unless a majority of the judges in active service order a
rehearing by the circuit sitting en banc.
22
Section 46(c) as enacted in 1948 provides only a procedural framework for
en bane decisions; no substantive guidelines were set out to identify which cases
deserved en bane treatment. Each court of appeals then established guidelines, a
step the Supreme Court approved in 1953: "The court [of appeals] is left free to
devise its own administrative machinery to provide the means whereby a major-
ity may order [an en bane] hearing."' 23 Each circuit promulgated rules gov-
erning the procedure for en bane consideration, though only one listed
substantive criteria.24
Such criteria finally were adopted in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
35, promulgated in 1968 under section 46(c) of the Judicial Code.25 That rule
states that parties may file suggestions for rehearings en bane, but they are "not
favored" and "ordinarily will not be ordered" except to "secure or maintain
uniformity" in decisions, or when the case "involves a question of exceptional
importance."' 26 In the wake of rule 35, each circuit has repromulgated rules and
1911, ch. 231, § 117, 36 Stat. 1131 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 46 (1982)) mandates three-
judge panels), certified question answered on other grounds, 304 U.S. 264 (1938) with Commissioner
v. Textile Mills Sec. Corp., 117 F.2d 62, 67-71 (3d Cir. 1940) (en bane) (Sections 117-118 of Judici-
ary Act of 1911 do not prohibit en bane decisions), aff'd, 314 U.S. 326 (1941). The Third Circuit
decision was motivated by the need to find a method to resolve intracircuit conflicts other than
Supreme Court review. Lowry v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 707 F.2d 721, 734-35 (3d Cir.) (per curiam)
(en bane) (Gibbons, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893 (1983).
19. 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
20. Id. at 333-35.
21. Judicial Code and Judiciary Act, Pub L. No. 80-773, § 46(c), 62 Stat. 869, 871-72 (1948)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1982)).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1982). The statute reads:
Cases and controversies shall be heard and determined by a court or panel of not more
than three judges (except that the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
may sit in panels of more than three judges if its rules so provide), unless a hearing or
rehearing before the court in bane is ordered by a majority of the circuit judges of the
circuit who are in regular active service. A court in bane shall consist of all circuit judges
in regular active service, or such number of judges as may be prescribed in accordance with
section 6 of Public Law 95-486 (92 Stat. 1633), except that any senior circuit judge of the
circuit shall be eligible to participate, at his election and upon designation and assignment
pursuant to section 294(c) of this title and the rules of the circuit, as a member of an in
bane court reviewing a decision of a panel of which such judge was a member.
Id.
23. Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 250 (1953).
24. MICH. Note, supra note 1, at 1641 n.17 (listing and discussing old circuit rules). Only one
rule, Fifth Circuit Rule 25(a) repealed in 1968, listed substantive criteria, and they were identical to
those found in present Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35(a). Id.
25. See supra note 22; FED. R. ApP. P. 35 advisory committee's note.
26. FED. R. App. P. 35. The rule, in pertinent part, states:
(a) When Hearing or Rehearing in Banc Will be Ordered. A majority of the circuit
judges who are in regular active service may order that an appeal or other proceeding be
heard or reheard by the court of appeals in bane. Such a hearing or rehearing is not fa-
vored and ordinarily will not be ordered except (1) when consideration by the full court is
[Vol. 67
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procedures to govern both litigant and judicial procedures for determining
whether a panel decision should be en banced.2 7 The circuit rules largely repli-
cate the language in rule 35 and do not provide greater specificity regarding the
substantive criteria.
2 8
Even before rule 35 was promulgated, concerns were expressed over the
number of en banc decisions rendered by the circuit courts. 29 These concerns
continued into the 1970s30 and were exacerbated in the late 1970s and early
1980s by the increased caseload in appellate courts31 and the increasing number
of federal appellate judges.32 Both factors presumably threatened to increase the
necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of its decisions, or (2) when the proceeding
involves a question of exceptional importance.
(b) Suggestion of a Party for Hearing or Rehearing in Banc. A party may suggest the
appropriateness of a hearing or rehearing in bane. No response shall be filed unless the
court shall so order. The clerk shall transmit any such suggestion to the members of the
panel and the judges of the court who are in regular active service but a vote need not be
taken to determine whether the cause shall be heard or reheard in bane unless a judge in
regular active service or a judge who was a member of the panel that rendered a decision
sought to be reheard requests a vote on such a suggestion made by a party.
Id. 35(a)-(b).
27. See infra note 28. From a reading of numerous en bane cases, as well as from reviewing the
data outlined infra part III (which indicates that 160 out of 224 en bane decisions were preceded by
a panel opinion), the paradigmatic situation involves a litigant seeking a rehearing en bane of a panel
decision. See infra text accompanying notes 182-201. For this reason, that situation was chosen as a
point of reference for this Article. It should be noted, however, that an en bane court can be con-
vened in lieu of a three-judge panel (an en bane "hearing"), and that it can be convened after a panel
hears a case but before it issues a decision. See MICH. Note supra note 1, at 1638 n.5. Also, for
convenience, this Article refers to petitions or requests for an en bane rehearing, although a strict
reading of rule 35 reveals that only "suggestions" for rehearing en bane properly can be offered by
litigants. United States v. Buljubasic, 828 F.2d 426,427 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 67 (1987).
The circuits provide that any member of the court can request sua sponte a poll of the circuit judges
to determine whether a majority wishes to rehear a panel decision en bane. Eg., 6TH CIR. R. 14(a).
Finally, this Article does not address the interesting question of whether an en bane decision can
itself be heard (or reheard) en bane. Compare Hitchcock v. Wainwright, 777 F.2d 628, 629 (11th
Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (en bane) (treated as a petition for rehearing under FED. R. APP. P. 40),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Hitchcock v. Duggar, 107 S. Ct. 1821 (1987) with id. at 629-30
(Kravitch & Johnson, JJ., dissenting) (treated under FED. R. APP. P. 35).
28. The individual circuits can "make and amend" their own rules to govern their practice.
FED. R. APP. P. 47. Those circuit rules dealing with en bane procedures are: D.C. CiR. R. 15; lsT
CIR. R. 35.1; 2D CIR. R. (pt. II) § 35; 3D CIR. R. 22; 4TH CIR. R. 35; 5TH CIR. R. 35; 6TH CIR. R.
14; 7TH CIR. R. 40(c); 8TH Cip. R. 16; 9TH CR. R. 35-1 to -3; 10TH CIa. R. 35; 11TH Cia. R. 35-1
to -11. In addition, the circuits sometimes publish their own internal operating procedures (INT. OP.
P.); those dealing with en bane procedures are as follows: lST CIR, INT. Op. P. X.; 3D CIR. INT. OP.
P. VIII; 4TH CIaR. INT. Op. P. 35.1; 5TH CIR. INT. Op. P. 35; 6TH CIR. INT. OP. P. 18; 7TH CIR. INT.
Op. P. 5; 8TH CIR. INT. Op. P. App. VI(D); 9TH CIR. INT. Op. P. II(E) & (K); 10TH CIR. INT. OP.
P. IN BANC PROCEDURE; 11TH CIR. INT. Op. P. 35.
29. N.Y.U. Note, supra note 17, at 576-77 (noting lost efficiencies in cases being disposed finally
through en bane rather than panel process).
30. Washy, Inconsistency in the United States Courts of Appeals: Dimensions and Mechanisms
for Resolution, 32 VAND. L. REv. 1343, 1364-66 (1979) (interviews of Ninth Circuit judges indicated
that they thought en bane sittings were less effective in a large court; "active-duty judges were tired
of en bancs and want to avoid them"); FORDHAM Comment, supra note 1, at 417-18 (time lost and
backlogs created); MICH. Note, supra note 1, at 1644-45 (extra court and litigant time; impairment
of finality of panel decisions); see also J. HOWARD, COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDI-
CIAL SYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE SECOND, FIFTH, AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRcurrs 217
(1981) ("the truth is that most circuit judges regard en bancs as a 'damned nuisance' "); R. POSNER,
THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 101 (1985) (en bane procedure is "unwieldy").
31. See infra text accompanying footnotes 47-78 for fuller discussion.
32. Congressional legislation in 1978 and 1984 increased the number of authorized appellate
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number of en bane decisions and such an increase was indeed noted. It was
largely for these reasons that the Eleventh Circuit was severed from the Fifth
Circuit in 1980. 33 En bane decision making among more than twenty judges (as
was true in the old Fifth Circuit) was viewed as unwieldy3 4 and litigants were
perceived as asking for en bane review at an increasing rate.
35
The federal appellate judiciary made a number of responses to these con-
cerns. To promote uniformity among panel decisions, the lack of which was
thought to be a significant problem, 36 several circuits by rule or case law stated
that only en bane courts, not panels of the circuit, could overrule or disagree
with another panel of the same circuit, absent an intervening and controlling
Supreme Court decision. 37 In another attempt to promote uniformity, several
circuits began to circulate draft panel decisions among all the judges in order to
bring possible conflicts to the attention of the panel.3 8 The Seventh Circuit be-
gan to use this procedure as a quasi-en bane process to overrule prior panel
decisions. 39 With regard to the bar, nine of the circuits amended their rules to
judgeships by 35 (97 to 132) and 36 (132 to 168), respectively. Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
486, 3, 92 Stat. 1629, 1632 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 44 (1982); Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 201, 98 Stat. 333, 346-347 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C.
44). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 44(a) (West 1987 & Supp.1988), the number of authorized judge-
ships per circuit is as follows:
Circuits Number of Judges
District of Columbia ............................................................................ . 12
First ............................................................................ 6
Second .............................................................................. 13
Third ............................................................................ . 12
Fourth .............................................................................. . 11
Fifth ............................................................................. 16
Sixth ............................................................................. 15
Seventh .............................................................................. . 11
Eighth ............................................................................. 10
N inth ............................................................................. 28
Tenth ............................................................................. 10
Eleventh ............................................................................ . 12
Federal ......................................... 12
33. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat.
1994 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1982)).
34. H.R. REP. No. 96-1390, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 3, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4236, 4238.
35. This perception is based on speaking with an admittedly limited sample of federal judges
and of lawyers who practice in federal courts. See infra text accompanying notes 50-51. This data
seems to support the assertion that the absolute number of litigant petitions has risen over the years,
but not necessarily that the rate of petitions per cases disposed of on the merits has increased. Id.
36. Washy, supra note 30, at 1353-59. But see Washy, Communication in the Ninth Circuit: A
Concern for Collegiality, 11 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 73, 113 (1987) ("intracircuit inconsistency in
the Ninth Circuit is not the hot topic of ten years ago").
37. Overton, supra note 17, at 215 & nn. 58-59 (listing cases and/or court rules from seven
circuits).
38. See 3D CIR. INT. Op. P. V.C.; 4TH CR. INT. Op. P. 36.2; 6TH CIR. INT. OP. P. 14.3; 7TH
CIR. R. INT. Op. P. 40(f).
39. E-g., Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 713 n.6 (7th Cir. 1987) (a panel decision
overruling a prior panel was circulated among all judges and a majority rejected rehearing the issue
en banc); Kansas City Term. Ry. v. Jordon Mfg. Co., 750 F.2d 551, 551 n.* (7th Cir. 1984) (same).
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require litigants to state and verify expressly why their cases were worthy of en
bane treatment. 40 The Ninth Circuit, now the court with the most judges,
4 1
began to use "mini-en bancs" of eleven judges rather than the entire court.42
These measures sought to ameliorate the tension between majority rule and the
extra demands of the en bane process.
Concern with the purported use of the en bane procedure for "political"
purposes also has existed for two decades, though in a less dramatic way than at
present. Political scientists, eager to apply the tools of behavioral jurisprudence,
produced studies which indicated that Presidents typically filled the lower fed-
eral judiciary with individuals of their own political party.4 3 Others looked for,
and found, fairly consistent voting blocs in panels and en bane courts, the results
of which could be characterized with some degree of confidence as liberal or
conservative.44 The Fifth Circuit judges in particular seemed to be cognizant of
the partisan potential of en bancs, and believed that by en bane decision making
in controversial 1960s school desegregation cases they would give greater au-
thority and legitimacy to their decisions.45
Thus, it is misleading to label the current en bane process an ideological
phenomenon, as is now the vogue, without further justification and exploration.
Perhaps more significant from an historical perspective, however, is that the en
bane procedure has survived the buffeting of over three contentious decades rela-
40. See D.C. CIR. R. 15(a)(3); 1ST CIR. R. 35; 3D CIR. R. 22; 5TH CIR. R. 35; 6TH CR. R.
14(b); 7TH CIR. R. 16(b); 8TH CIR. R. 16(d); 10TH CIR. R. 35.2; l1TH CIR. R. 26(c) & (f).
41. See supra note 32.
42. 9TH CR. R. 25. The rule was authorized by the Omnibus Judgeship Bill of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1982)). See generally Bennett & Pem-
broke, "Mini" In Banc Proceedings. A Survey of Court Practices, 34 CLaV. ST. L. REv. 531 (1986)
(discussion of the usefulness of mini en bane procedures).
43. The voluminous literature is well summarized in S. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, THE FED-
ERAL COURTS AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM 46-47 (3d ed. 1985). See also Goldman, supra note 7 (dis-
cussion of Reagan's attempt to reshape the federal bench by appointing conservative judges). For a
somewhat different view, see R. POSNER, supra note 30, at 29-31 (suggesting that patronage and
merit appointments compete with more overtly "political" appointments). See also Solomon, The
Politics of Appointment and the Federal Courts' Role in Regulating America US. Courts of Appeals
Judgeships from T.R. to F.D.R., 1984 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 285 (contending that Franklin
Roosevelt administration first began systematic, partisan appointments to the lower federal
judiciary).
44. S. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, supra note 43, at 137-40. For a study focusing on voting blocs
discovered in the en bane decisions of the D.C. Circuit, see Atkins, Decision-Making Rules and
Judicial Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals, 25 W. POL. Q. 626, 626 (1972). See also J.
GOULDEN, THE BENCHWARMERS: THE PRIVATE WORLD OF THE POWERFUL FEDERAL JUDGES
265 (1974) (briefly discussing same).
Throughout this Article, the terms "liberal" and "conservative" are used as political scientists
have operationally defined them for use in studying judicial voting behavior. Briefly, this term
means that a "liberal"vote is one that upholds the claims of (inter alia) criminal defendants, civil
liberty plaintiffs, labor unions and employees, plaintiffs in tort cases, individuals or small businesses
against large businesses, and the government in regulation of business. A "conservative" vote is the
opposite. For examples of this definitional use, see Goldman, Conflict on the US. Courts of Appealh;
1965-71: A Quantitative Analysis, 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 635, 642-43 (1973); COLUM. Note, supra note
8, at 776-78.
45. See, eg., J. HowARD, supra note 30, at 205-18 (extensively discusses Fifth Circuit desegre-
gation cases such as Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate School Dist., 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1969)
(en bane), rev'd, 396 U.S. 290 (1970)).
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tively intact.4 6 , While the more recent attacks have parallels in prior decades,
the criticisms are now more vocal and more likely to have some affect on the
bench and the bar. Accordingly, it is appropriate at this point to revisit the two
lines of criticism of the modem en bane process.
B. Functional Critique
Putting aside the asserted ideological behavior of certain federal judges for
a moment, this section briefly surveys the criticism of the en bane process that
its costs far outweigh its benefits, and suggests how to evaluate it. The costs of
the en bane process have already been alluded to. In the typical case a panel
decision receives the full benefit of the litigants' briefing and the three-judge
panel's preparation of an opinion or opinions. To then en bane a case, a litigant
or one of the members of the court must file a written suggestion for rehearing
for all the circuit judges' consideration. If a majority of the court rejects the
request, some of the judges may nevertheless issue statements explaining their
respective votes.47
If a majority of the court grants the request, the case is set for a full round
of rebriefing and, sometimes, renewed oral argument. After that, the circuit
judges must confer and render their respective opinions. This process, commen-
tators remark, results in fragmented opinions of dubious precedential value,
48
46. Cf MICH. Note, supra note 1, at 1653-55 (arguing that en bancs should be curbed by elimi-
nating litigant petitions and en bancing only in "rare" cases, and that elimination of the entire pro-
cess should be considered). Apparently there are no plans to amend rule 35 or make any other
significant structural changes. Rather, moral suasion directed to the bench and bar seems to be the
order of the day.
One way to limit en bancs would be to curb litigant petitions for rehearing by sanctioning
"frivolous" petitions. There is ample precedent elsewhere in the Federal Rules for such sanctions.
Eg., FED. R. Civ. P. 11; FED. R. App. P. 38; Sup. CT. R. 49.2. Given, however, the amount of
uncertainty (and litigation) generated by recent attempts to punish such frivolity, it seems prudent to
use this as a weapon of the last resort. See generally Martineau, Frivolous Appeals: The Uncertain
Federal Response, 1984 DuKE L.J. 845 (analysis of sanctions and standards for frivolous appeals,
and a proposal for a new method of deterrence); Vairo, Rule 11: A CriticalAnalysis, 118 F.R.D. 189
(1988) (discussion of procedure and problems of FED. R. Civ. P. 11); Note, Plausible Pleadings:
Developing Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1987) (discussion of standards
necessary for invocation of FED. R. CV. P. 11). However, on April 1, 1988, the First Circuit
promulgated 1sT CiR. R. 35.1 which authorizes sanctions "[i]f a petition for rehearing or for rehear-
ing en bane is found, on its face, to be wholly without merit, vexatious, multifarious, or filed princi-
pally for delay." IST CIR. R. 35.1.
47. These statements are exemplified by the opinions from the D.C. Circuit discussed in the
introduction to this Article. See supra text accompanying notes 10-16. In the empirical study of en
bane decisions during 1985-87 presented infra part III, there are 58 cases in which denial of en bane
rehearing was accompanied by an opinion or opinions. Cf Issacs v. Kemp, 782 F.2d 896, 897 n.1
(11th Cir.) (Hill, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane) (criticizing the proliferation of
dissenting opinions in various circuits from orders denying en bane rehearing, but issuing his own
since the practice is now "commonly accepted"), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164, reh'g denied, Kemp v.
Coleman, 478 U.S. 1014 (1986); Cannon v. Kroger Co., 837 F.2d 660, 660 (4th Cir. 1988)
(Murnaghan, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane) ("It is indeed unusual, if not extraordi-
nary, for a member of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals who disagrees with a panel opinion to
continue to fight after rehearing en bane has been denied by the majority of the court."). In these
and other citations the denial of certiorari or later action by the Supreme Court refers also to the
panel decision, if any.
48. Kaufman, supra note 5, at 8; MICH. Note, supra note 1, at 1646; FORDHAM Comment,
supra note 1, at 422.
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with a concomitant development of acrimony among concurring and dissenting
judges.
49
The decision to en banc also affects how and when judicial resources will be
applied to the remaining cases on the docket. Substantial delays can result, not
only in rendering the en banc decision itself, but also in other cases not being
heard en banc.50 Moreover, as the finality accorded panel decisions erodes, liti-
gants may react by filing more suggestions for en banc review, even when their
cases clearly do not deserve such treatment.51 This tendency is exacerbated by
the absence of any criteria, beyond those provided by rule 35, to help determine
which cases deserve, or are likely subjects for, en banc treatment. All these
factors burden judges with yet more paperwork.
Despite the hardiness and renewed vigor of these criticisms, the supposed
positive attributes of the en banc process have an equally long pedigree. The two
ostensible purposes of the process, as embodied in rule 35, are to promote uni-
formity of law within a circuit and to permit the full complement of judges to
pass on cases of "exceptional importance." If three-judge panels are assembled
by random selection of the eligible judges, 52 then it seems inevitable that differ-
49. Kaufman, supra note 5, at 7 ("such proceedings merely serve to exacerbate conflicts"); see
also Bartlett ex rel Neuman v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1240, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Edwards, J., concur-
ring in denial of rehearing en bane) ("Collegiality cannot exist if every dissenting judge feels obliged
to lobby his or her colleagues to rehear the case en banc in order to vindicate the judge's position.").
Some evidence exists that as the number of judges on a court increases, it becomes increasingly
difficult for the judges to consult and negotiate in any meaningful way. See R. POSNER, supra note
30, at 14, 100 (observing the formula n(n-l)/2 gives the number of links to connect members of a set;
36 for a set of 9, 55 for a set of 11, etc.; the number grows exponentially); Wasby, supra note 30, at
1364-66 (overview of the correlation between the size of the court and the need for en bane
decisions).
50. Kaufman, supra note 5, at 7 ("The interval between oral argument and en bane disposition
is five times as great--on average-as that for a panel disposition."); MICH. Note, supra note 1, at
1644 & n.35 (reporting similar results from survey of panel and en bane decisions, and also stating
that average time between oral argument and opinion filing in panels was lower in the Second Circuit
(with one of the lowest en bane rates) as compared to the D.C. Circuit (thought to have a higher
rate)).
51. Kaufman, supra note 5, at 8; MICH. Note, supra note I, at 1645.
52. Although rules occasionally make reference to the practice, e.g., 8TH CIR. INT. OP. P. § I C
1, apparently no statute or rule requires that membership on panels be randomly assigned. Rather, it
simply appears to be accepted that one of the duties assigned to a chief judge of a circuit, see 28
U.S.C. §§ 45(b) & 46(a) (1982), is to assign circuit judges to panels in an equitable and random
fashion. T. MARVELL, APPELLATE COURTS AND LAwYERs: INFORMATION GATHERING IN THE
ADVERSARY SYSTEM 106 & nn.10-11 (1978); J. HOWARD, supra note 30, at 197; Atkins, supra note
44, at 628 & n.8. One easy way to reduce the use of en bane cases in order to control intracircuit
uniformity, is to make the panels as representative as possible of the views of the majority of judges
on the circuit. Thus non-random selection can result in greater uniformity. Kornhauser & Sager,
Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82,90 & n.13, 96 n.18 (1986). Presumably, the reason this view
has never been adopted is the potential for tension and animosity among judges and the possiblilty
the bold "result-oriented" nature of the enterprise would be unacceptable in our current legal cul-
ture.
Occasionally, some charge that panel assignments are skewed to "pack" panels with favored
judges on important cases. This practice allegedly occurred in some civil rights cases in the 1960s.
See MICH. Note, supra note 1, at 1649 n.67 (discussing Armstrong v. Board of Educ., 323 F.2d 333,
352-61 (5th Cir. 1963) (Cameron, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 908 (1964)); Atkins &
Zavoina, Judicial Leadership on the Court of Appeals A Probability Analysis of Panel Assignment in
Race Relation Cases on the Fifth Circuit, 18 AM. I. POL. Sci. 701 (1974) (finding some evidence for
allegation). But see 3. HOWARD, supra note 30, at 232-47 (finding no evidence of panel packing in
statistical review of Fifth Circuit cases).
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ent panels will, intentionally or not, produce conflicting or arguably conflicting
results.5 3 Uniformity could be increased, however, were panels to religiously
follow the injunction that they not overrule the decisions of a prior panel.54 The
large number of cases, judges, and panels, however, apparently hinders commu-
nication and prevents this ideal from being fully achieved.
Aside from the uniformity rationale, some argue the en banc process ulti-
mately improves the circuit's decision making process. This view is based on the
belief that, at least to a limit, the involvement and interaction of more judges
leads to sounder decisions.5 5 Especially when cases are "important," the partici-
pation of all the judges may contribute to institutional harmony by permitting
the entire court to participate. 56 With regard to outside constituencies, particu-
larly the bar, an en banc decision is assumed to command greater authority and
compliance, since it is not simply the product of a three-judge panel.5 7 As long
as judges use the en banc process sparingly, a circuit can use the process to
signal constituencies that it is resolving a particularly important issue.58
It is perhaps surprising that the debate over the en banc proceeding has
been conducted in largely utilitarian terms. Ironically, some commentators,
criticizing the most recent use of the en banc process for its lack of efficiency, 59
are often the first to condemn the use of cost-benefit tests or balancing formulas
when interpreting or applying various procedural requirements. The tests, usu-
ally associated with the law-and-economics school, 6" are said to be inherently
flawed and to give insufficient weight to other values served by the procedure or
53. See Beatty v. Chesapeake Center, Inc., 835 F.2d 71, 75 n.1 (4th Cir. 1987) (en bane)
(Murnaghan, J., concurring). Reasonable judges can disagree over whether different panel decisions
in fact conflict. See Klein v. Stop-N-Go, 824 F.2d 453, 453 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (Krupan-
sky, J., dissenting) (charging that panel majority created an intracircuit conflict and sought to hide
its decision by not publishing the decision); compare Bartlett ex rel Neuman v. Bowen, 824 F.2d
1240, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Silberman, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (favors en
banc hearings only for "cases of exceptional importance," this is not such a case), with id. at 1249
(joint statement of Bork, Buckley, D. Ginsburg, Starr & Williams, JJ., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc) (arguing there was a conflict in the panel decisions and the case ought to be heard
en bane). A second problem is that the eventual en bane decision may not ultimately decide all
issues definitively. MICH. Note, supra note 1, at 1646-47.
54. See supra text accompanying notes 36-39.
55. R. POSNER, supra note 30, at 14, 100; Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 52, at 97-98; MICH.
Note, supra note 1, at 1649. The disadvantage to increasing the number ofjudges is addressed supra
note 49.
56. See MICH. Note, supra note 1, at 1648-49; Wasby, supra note 30, at 1364 (in making a
"major new policy decision... the vast majority of a large court does not wish to be disfranchised");
Wasby, supra note 36, at 108 (interviews of Ninth Circuit judges indicate that most view communi-
cations about en bane decisions to be a "healthy conflict in an exchange of views").
57. See J. Howard, supra note 30, at 218; Overton, supra note 17, at 219-20; MIcH. Note, supra
note 1, at 1648, 1650.
58. Kg., United States v. Devine, 768 F.2d 210, 210-11 (7th Cir. 1985) (en bane) (per curiam)
(case presents "a recurrent problem on which authoritative guidance is necessary .... The purpose
of this opinion is to serve notice on the bar that the court intends to enforce the rules [concerning
length of briefs] strictly."), cert. denied, 479 U.S 848, reh'g denied, 479 U.S. 1001 (1986).
59. Bartlett ex rel. Neuman v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1240, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Edwards, J.,
concurring in denial of rehearing en bane) ("In fact, the institutional cost of rehearing cases en banc
is extraordinary."); Kaufman, supra note 5, at 7, 8, & 57.
60. E-g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 517-54 (3d ed. 1986).
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the underlying substantive law. 61 Many of the values the en bane process serves
are admittedly intangible, while the "costs" in added court time and the like can
be more easily measured. Therefore, a pure "efficiency" test may be inappropri-
ate for evaluating en bane decision making.
More generally, the controversy over en bane decision making results from
the unsurprising fact that en bane review cannot be all things to all people. As
Professor Judith Resnik has observed, no one model of appellate review can at
the same time maximize procedural values such as finality, economy, consis-
tency, impartiality, and power concentration. 62 One or more of these values is
apt to be maximized at the expense of others. 63 Her analysis applies neatly to
the en bane review process: the power it concentrates in the hands of a circuit
majority, and the consistency and perceived impartiality it can promote, are at
the expense of judicial economy and finality of panel decisions. Thus, ulti-
mately, a pure efficiency analysis is inappropriate because the en bane process is
foreordained to fail any test of efficiency. It is nevertheless instructive to ex-
amine the data available on en bane decision making. At the very least, this
examination will provide some objective benchmarks with which to measure
roughly the purported burden of the en bane procedure on the functioning of the
federal courts of appeals.
Any assessment of the burden of the en bane process should begin with the
overall caseload size of the federal appellate courts. The caseload has seen a
period of astonishing growth. The number of cases filed in the courts of appeals
grew from less than 4,000 in 1960 to over 30,000 in the mid-1980s, over a 700%
increase. 64 In contrast, the number of appellate judges in that period roughly
doubled.65 Though it is now fashionable to dismiss the litigation "explosion" as
a myth (because the increases are less startling when viewed in per capita
terms), 66 there is no doubt the absolute numbers from the federal appellate
courts have reached unprecedented heights and show little sign of lessening.
67
The data on en bane decisions during this period is less spectacular. During
the 1960s and 1970s, the number of en bane decisions averaged about one per-
61. E.g., Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 405 (1987) (Stevens, I., dissenting) ("The
interest in vindication of constitutional violations unquestionably outweighs the interest in avoiding
the expense and inconvenience of defending unmeritorious claims."); Mullenix, Burying (With Kind-
ness) the Felicific Calculus of Civil Procedure, 40 VAND. L. REv. 541, 544-45 (1987) (author "rejects
and warns of the incipient Benthamization of civil procedure"); see also Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L.
REv. 837, 840 (1984) ("Procedure is a mechanism for expressing political and social relationships
and is a device for producing outcomes.").
62. Resnik, supra note 61, at 845-59, 874 (values can be in tension).
63. Resnik, supra note 61, at 874.
64. R. MARTINEAU, APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 65-66 (1987); R. POSNER, supra
note 30, at 63-65; 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 17, § 3506, at 25-26.
65. 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 17, § 3506, at 24-25; 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 44, Historical and Revision Notes (West 1968 & Supp. 1987) (listing number of authorized judge-
ships at various times); supra note 32.
66. Eg., Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3 (1986); Galanter,
Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About
Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983).
67. R. POSNER, supra note 30, at 76; Howard, Our Litigious Society, 38 S.C.L. REv. 365, 367
(1987); Marvell, Caseload Growth-Past and Future Trends, 71 JUDICATURE 151 (1987). However,
according to the latest data presented in Table 2, the rate of growth is now falling. See infra Table 2.
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cent of all cases disposed of on the merits.68 This pattern continued into the
1980s. 69 As Table 1 indicates, the number of en bancs in this decade has slowly,
though somewhat erratically, climbed from 65 in 1980 to 88 in 1987; in 1984,
the number rose to 106, and has not reached that figure again. Table 2 is even
more instructive. It demonstrates that while the caseload--cases disposed on
the merits, and thus commanding the most judicial attention-has inexorably
increased, the rate of en bane cases has not kept pace. Until 1987, when the
caseload only rose 1.63%, the caseload had risen at about 10% per year. In
contrast, the percent of those cases en banced not only remained well below one
percent, but the percentage was falling overall, save for the aberrational year of
1984.
This data lends itself to several straightforward conclusions. On its face, it
does not seem that cases which account for about one-half of one percent of an
entire caseload constitute an intolerable burden. Nor is there evidence of an
abrupt increase in en banes during the latter years of the Reagan Administra-
tion. Much of the increase that exists could simply be due to more cases and
more judges. Moreover, large numbers of en bancs seem concentrated in certain
circuits: the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits all reached
double figures in the number of en bancs more than once during the seven years
presented in the tables. 70 The other circuits are consistently in the single digits,
and two-the First and Second-have very small numbers of en bane deci-
sions. 71 Finally, it will be noted that roughly one-fifth of the en bancs were
decided on the briefs without the additional burden of oral argument.72 Render-
ing en bane decisions on the basis of briefs alone may make such decisions less
time consuming.73
68. See J. HOWARD, supra note 30, at 42, 193 (less than 1% of cases studied in 1965.67 were en
bancs); S. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, supra note 43, at 23 (en bancs are "exceedingly rare"); N.Y.U.
Note, supra note 17, at 564 (1.5% of cases in fiscal 1964), 746 (total of 422 en bancs from 1940
through June 30, 1964, approximately 17 per year); Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States
Courts of Appeals Revisited, 69 AM. POL. Sc. REv. 491, 493 n.7 (1975) (in study of non-unanimous
decisions from 1965-1971, 202 (less than 1%) were en bane).
69. See infra Table 2.
70. See supra Table 1 & infra Table 2.
71. Second Circuit judges have long been on record as opposing any extensive use of the en
bane procedure. See J. HOWARD, supra note 30, at 218; FORDHAM Comment, supra note 1, at 411-
16; Kaufman, supra note 5, at 7; MICH. Note, supra note 1, at, 1652.
It is sometimes stated that certain circuits have an inordinate number of en bancs. See Kauf-
man, supra note 5, at 7 (Fifth and Ninth); COLUM. Note, supra note 8, at 787 n.73 (Fourth, Fifth,
and Eleventh). Table 1 confirms that observation.
Rates of en bane decisions per caseload or per judge in each circuit are not presented in Table 1
since the extremely low percentages are not very meaningful. Nevertheless, there is a rough correla-
tion throughout the 1980s between those circuits with the higher case loads (4e., the Fourth, Fifth,
Ninth and Eleventh) and a higher number of en bane decisions. Even here, however, there are
anomalies; for example, the Fourth Circuit fluctuated between 18, 6, and 13 en bancs in 1985, 1986,
and 1987. The Tenth Circuit had 16 en bancs in 1984, then fell to 4 in 1985. Meanwhile, the Sixth
Circuit, which now rivals the Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits in number of cases, has never had
more than nine per year.
72. See supra Table 2.
73. See J. HOWARD, supra note 30, at 216; FORDHAM Comment, supra note 1, at 419-20. For a
proposal to eliminate oral argument in most appellate cases, see Martineau, The Value of Appellate
Oral Argument: A Challenge to the Conventional Wisdom, 72 IOWA L. REv. 1 (1986). See also J.
CECIL & 0. STIENATRA, DECIDING CASES WITHOUT ARGUMENT: AN EXAMINATION o FOUR
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There is also much the tables do not reveal. For example, they do not
document the extra judicial and litigant time and resources en bane decisions
require, nor the delay they cause. Those sorts of concerns are presumably quan-
tifiable,74 but are beyond the scope of this study. A new source of data, how-
ever, does shed some light on the issues of added time burdens and subsequent
delays in decision making. Until the past several years neither the circuits nor
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts kept data systematically
on the number of suggestions for rehearing en bane filed by litigants.75 These
statistics are now available and are presented in Table 3.
More so than with the raw en bane numbers, comparisons and conclusions
must be cautiously drawn here because few definitive statements can be culled
from the sparse historical data on suggestions for rehearings en banc. 76 A com-
parison between the historical and current data does suggest, however, that the
number of filings for rehearings en bane has increased, but it does not necessarily
indicate the rate of that increase. This conclusion is hardly surprising, given the
appellate caseload increase previously documented. Because over twelve percent
of disgruntled panel litigants, on the average, file en bane suggestions, however,
an added burden seems to have been placed on judges and their clerks, who must
read these petitions and evaluate them if a poll of judges is requested.77 One
might also question the, strategy or knowledge of the bar in filing so many sug-
gestions, when so few are granted.
78
More sophisticated and widespread data collection, both in the courts and
among lawyers, might reveal greater insights about the burdens and benefits of
the en bane procedure. The few statistics collected here suggest that the proce-
COURTS OF APPEALS (Federal Judicial Center 1987) (study of screening practices, methods, and
criterion used to select cases for nonargument disposition; found time savings in those courts that
used such methods).
74. See, eg., supra note 50.
75. Interviews with John P. Hehman, Clerk for United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit (Oct. 21, 1987), and Maijorie B. Waskewich, Administrative Office Appeals Program Ana-
lyst (Oct. 22, 1987) (notes on file with the author).
76. Kaufman, supra note 5, at 7 (750 suggestions in second Circuit over 5 year period); see
MICH. Note, supra note 1, at 1643 n.23 (256 suggestions in 7th Circuit between Sept. 1, 1969 and
Aug. 31, 1973); id. at 1644 (135 suggestions in D.C. Circuit in fiscal 1973); N.Y.U. Note, supra note
17, at 729-30 n.246 (correspondence with personnel from each circuit indicated that about 10% of
defeated panel litigants petitioned for en bane review).
77. FED. R. APP. P. 35(b). Apparently, no data on the number of polls is systemically col-
lected, and it does not appear in Court of Appeals Report Forms JS-30 or JS-34. Cf United States v.
Samuels, 808 F.2d 1298, 1299 (8th Cir. 1987) (Lay, C.J., concurring in denial of rehearing en bane)
(contending that neither FED. R. APP. P. 35(b) nor 40(a) nor 8TH CIR. LOCAL R. 16(B) gives circuit
judges authority to request "a rehearing en bane after a panel opinion has been issued when no party
to the litigation has filed a petition for rehearing en bane").
78. Apparently, the only study concerning litigant use of suggestions for rehearing en bane is
Uelmen, The Influence of the Solicitor General Upon Supreme Court Disposition of Federal Circuit
Court Decisions: A Closer Look at the Ninth Circuit Record, 69 JUDICATURE 360, 365 (1986). The
author suggests that the Solicitor General will more readily file the suggestion if he can convince a
majority of the circuit that the panel decision is likely to be accepted for review and reversed by the
Supreme Court; in addition, the Solicitor General may use it as a "threat" to go over the circuit's
head if the suggestion is not granted. Id. This theory, however, is belied by the study's own data that
during 1980-1984 "the 12 courts of appeals denied 81 percent of the en banc petitions authorized by
the Solicitor General." Id; see also T. MARVELL, supra note 52, at 67-69 (survey of appellate law-
yers revealed lack of knowledge of appellate court procedures).
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dure is not the great burden described by some of its critics, but that the num-
bers are high enough to indicate the value of exploring techniques for mitigating
the burdens without crippling the en bane process. One method would be to
develop more workable, and perhaps more narrow, criteria to identify cases wor-
thy of en bane review. Before turning to that task, this section explores the
related question of when and to what extent a majority of a circuit is justified in
forcing an en bane review of a panel ruling simply because it disagrees with the
ruling.
C. Ideological Critique
The Introduction to this Article noted the allegation that the Reagan-ap-
pointed judges have "politicized" the en bane process. This section explores in
the abstract what, if anything, is wrong with a President's appointees acting in
such a manner. Whether Reagan's appointees in particular have "politicized"
the process is addressed in Part III.
As legal scholars have addressed the efficiency concerns in earlier literature
on the en bane process, social scientists have studied the political or ideological
nature of courts for over two decades. Politics, the political scientists tell us, is
the "authoritative allocation of values for a society." 79 This task is the primary
responsibility of the executive and legislative branches of government. Whether
this conception of political power is appropriate in the judicial branch where it
may conflict with the traditional ideal of courts as "applying" the law to individ-
ual cases as opposed to "making" the law to achieve results desired by the jurist
is a subject of controversy.80 Although most of the legal community long ago
rejected this rigid dichotomy as both descriptively and normatively incomplete,
social scientists since World War II have nevertheless examined with great relish
how politics has invaded the judicial system.81
Many of these studies are remarkable in the extent to which they show that
the courts in general, and federal tribunals in particular, usually follow some
version of the traditional model of neutral lawmaking. Admittedly, various
studies reveal politics in all its glory at play in the federal courts. It is well
documented that a President usually appoints federal judges who are members
of his own political party,82 and undisputed that, on the average and over the
long term, Republican judges tend to vote more conservatively, and Democratic
judges more liberally, on a wide range of issues.83 However, despite these con-
clusions, studies of the federal appellate courts reveal that "consensus [is] actu-
79. S. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, supra note 43, at 2; J. HOWARD, supra note 30, at 15.
80. S. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, supra note 43, at 26-27.
81. See, ag., S. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, supra note 43, at 26-27.
82. See supra notes 7, 8, 41.
83. E.g., COLUM. Note, supra note 8, at 770 ("It is well established that Republican judicial
appointees vote differently from their Democratic colleagues."); see generally supra note 44 (studies
showing voting behavior along party lines).
In the text and elsewhere in this Article, the terms "party judge" and "party- or President-
administration appointed judge" are used interchangeably. Although these sets are not identical
they are close enough to use for the sake of convenience. Morgover, the reference to "party judge" is




En Banc Decisions by Circuit
1980-87a
CIRCUIT YEAR
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
District of
Columbia 5 5 5 10 3 5 2 4
First 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 1
Second 4 2 1 1 0 1 1 1
Third 5 14 5 5 3 5 5 8
Fourth 7 8 8 6 6 18 6 13
Fifth 24 21 12 11 19 13 18 10
Sixth 4 0 4 3 9 7 5 7
Seventh 5 2 7 8 6 3 7 8
Eighth 6 7 7 5 15 15 9 11
Ninth 3 5 9 4 14 6 5 7
Tenth 2 5 2 3 16 4 12 8
Eleventh 14 10 14 8 19 18 0
TOTALS 65 69 74 66 106 85 90 88
'Data in tables 1-2 are derived from Annual Reports of the Director of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts (hereinafter cited as AO Report); the "year" in this and other tables refers
to the federal fiscal year.
ally more characteristic of circuit courts than conflict."84 Well over eighty
percent of panel decisions in the past several decades have been unanimous-
hardly a sign of constant fracture along party or ideological lines.8 5 Even those
studies which investigated the relationship between judges' political parties and
their voting records found partisan identification, at best, weakly correlated with
decision making.8 6 Thus, data collection by itself provides only uneven support
for the charge of unbridled politicization of the federal circuits.
voting behavior, the correlation is stronger to the judge's party than to the party of the administra-
tion under which he or she was appointed. COLUM. Note, supra note 8, at 771.
84. J. HOWARD, supra note 30, at 3; see id at 184-85.
85. S. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, supra note 43, at 164-65; Goldman, supra note 68, at 493; cf
Atkins & Green, Consensus on the United States Courts of Appeal%- Illusion or Reality?, 20 AM. J.
POL. Sci. 735, 738 (1976) (actual lack of consensus not necessarily reflected in rate of dissent);
Songer, Consensual and Nonconsensual Decisions in Unanimous Opinions of the United States Courts
of Appeals, 26 AM. J. POL. Sci. 225, 238 (1982) (same).
86. J. HOWARD, supra note 30, at 173-75, 182; Goldman, supra note 68, at 496 & n.19, 505;
Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals, 1961-1964, 60 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 374, 380-83 (1966). Models linking judicial decision making with case characteristics and/or
judges' attributes can be established. See generally Aliotta, Combining Judges'Attributes and Case
Characteristics: An Alternative Approach to Explaining Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 71 JUDICA-
TURE 277 (1988) (correlation between political party identification, prestige of education. political
experience and prior judicial experience and particular judicial viewpoints); S. GOLDMAN & T.
JAHNIGE, supra note 43, at 147-48. The link between party identification alone, however, and judi-
cial voting patterns is a relatively weak one. Aliotta, supra, at 280.
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Table 2
En Banc Decisions: Totals and Percentages in 1980-87'
Number Number
of of
En Banc En Banc
Decisions Decisions % of
with Brief Submitted Total % Increase Caseload
and Oral Solely on En Banc Total in Heard
Year Argument Briefs Decisions Caseload Caseload En Banc
1980 45 20 65 10,598 .613
1981 52 17 69 11,980 13.04 .576
1982 68 6 74 12,327 2.89 .600
1983 56 10 66 13,217 7.22 .499
1984 95 11 106 14,327 8.40 .739
1985 76 9 85 16,369 14.25 .519
1986 71 19 90 18,199 11.18 .494
1987 73 15 88 18,502 1.63 .476
'Terminations on the merits.
Careful attention to the voting of the circuit judges President Reagan has
appointed also casts doubt on the charge. One study has observed that despite
the purported extreme political views of Reagan-appointed judges, the high rate
of consensus and the low visibility of many cases "militate against radical ideo-
logical change at the court of appeals level."'8 7 The study concluded that Rea-
gan appointees have voted essentially like other Republican-appointed judges.88
A similar study of the appellate judiciary has found that while Reagan-ap-
pointed jurists typically voted more conservatively than Democratic appointees,
their voting patterns "differed very little from those of other Republican
judges."' 89 It suggested that various factors, such as adherence to judicial re-
straint and moderation of views, may account "for these surprising results." 90
The en bane studies support the finding that historically, as now, en bane
decisions have accounted for less than one percent of court of appeals deci-
sions.9 1 They also indicate that en bancs exhibit more ideological clashes than
do panel decisions. Over the years, for example, only about twenty percent of en
bane decisions have been unanimous.92 Some judges have stated en bane pro-
87. Gottschall, Reagan's Appointments to the US. Court of Appeals: The Continuation of a
Judicial Revolution, 70 JUDICATURE 48, 50 (1986).
88. Id. at 53-54.
89. COLUM. Note, supra note 8, at 779. This study also noted that 96% of the decisions during
the period under review (1985-86) were unanimous. Id. at 789 n.77.
90. COLUM. Note, supra note 8, at 791.
91. See supra text accompanying note 68.
92. Atkins, supra note 44, at 632 (citing R. RICHARDSON AND K. VINES, THE POLITICS OF
FEDERAL COURTS 125 (1970)). For more recent data, see infra text accompanying notes 182-201
and tables four and six.



























































2,245 (13.71%) 2,264 (12.44%) 2,346 (12.67%)
'I wish to thank Majorie B. Waskewich, Appeals Program Analyst, Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, for providing me with the unpublished data which is the source of the raw
numbers in this Table. The percentages were calculated from the unpublished data and the merit
termination figures from each circuit available in the AO Reports.
b'As % of cases terminated on the merits.
ceedings were the least cohesive,93 and one writer has concluded that en bancs
"tap, and more accurately reflect, the basic ideological disagreements within the
court."' 94 On the other hand, one study of Reagan-appointed circuit judges
demonstrated that "in en banc cases, there was no consistent evidence that Rea-
gan judges were more ideologically extreme" than their Republican colleagues in
those cases.
95
The point of this excursion into the political science literature is two-fold.
First, it should remind the critics who charge the Reagan appointees with polit-
bane, as compared to panel, decisions is a statistical artifact. On a panel of three judges, two will
almost always agree on something even if all three reach decisions by flipping coins. Accordingly,
the rate of dissent on a panel is given by the rate of dissent of any single judge. If each judge on the
panel goes along with any given colleagues 90% of the time, panels will be unanimous in 90% of the
cases. The probability of unanimity falls as the size of the court increases. See Kornhauser & Sager,
supra note 52, at 99-100 (discussing Supreme Court voting behavior when determining whether to
grant certiorari). For example, applying a 90% agreement rate, to a circuit with 9 judges yields a
probability of unanimity of 0.9 to the seventh power, or 48%. The latter percentage falls even more
drastically if a lower disagreement rate is assumed. Therefore, a lower rate of unanimity among en
bane decisions is to be expected. Perhaps it is surprising that 18% of the en bane cases in the sample
were unanimous. See infra Table 6.
93. J. HOWARD, supra note 30, at 205-07 (interviews of circuit judges).
94. Atkins, supra note 44, at 638.
95. COLUM. Note, supra note 8, at 784.
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ical use of the en bane process of the danger of throwing stones from glass
houses. Scores of studies document that both Republican and Democratic cir-
cuit judges vote fairly consistently on liberal or conservative value scales
(although the correlation is not strong). Ideological voting works both ways.
Second, and more importantly, these studies should simultaneously serve to
quiet the rising chorus over the purported ideological use of the en bane proce-
dure. If circuit court decision making is characterized largely by consensus and
unanimous opinions, and if en bancs make up only tiny percentages of the
caseload, then the debate over the current en bane procedure seems dispropor-
tionate to the problem.
These observations return us, however, to the basic complaint over the
political use of an en bane rehearing. Statements abound in the literature9 6 and
case law97 that "mere" disagreement with a panel decision is insufficient to sup-
port an en bane rehearing, although this conclusion is rarely explained or de-
fended. Indeed, case law statements that disagreement with a panel decision is
sufficient are equally abounding.98 Nor does rule 35 on its face seem to prohibit
disagreement per se as a criterion for en bancing the panel decision.99
Moreover, powerful arguments exist to support the "disagreement" crite-
rion. All multi-member tribunals operate on the basis of majority rule. Histori-
cally the concept of a circuit sitting en bane followed rather than preceded the
creation of those courts, and until the 1930s the circuits did not have more than
three judges each (and hence did not need the en bane device). 100 But at least
with the benefit of hindsight, panels can be seen simply as a matter of conven-
96. See FORDHAM Comment, supra note 1, at 409.
97. Walters v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 312 F.2d 893, 894 (2d Cir. 1963) (en bane)
("[m]ere disagreement, or likelihood of disagreement, with the panel decision, has not generally been
regarded as sufficient reason for a further hearing"); Church of Scientology v. Foley, 640 F.2d 1335,
1341 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam) (Robinson, Edwards & R. Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981). For more recent examples, drawn from the
cases coded for part III of this Article, see Bartlett ex rel Neuman v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1240, 1243
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (Edwards, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en bane); Noxell Corp. v. Firehouse
No. 1 Bar-B-Que Restaurant, 774 F.2d 1180, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Wald, J., concurring in denial
of rehearing en banc) (concurring despite belief decision does not represent a correct construction of
applicable law); United States v. Singleton, 763 F.2d 1432, 1432 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Edwards, J.,
concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (although he "find[s] it difficult to subscribe to the panel's
decision").
98. E.g., E. 0. Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 815 F.2d 1034, 1035 (5th Cir.) (Reavley, J., dissenting)
("refusal to correct and clarify the panel opinion"), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 44 (1987). Sometimes
the "merely" incorrect standard is coupled with language drawn from rule 35. Leving v. CMP
Publications, Inc., 753 F.2d 1341, 1343 (5th Cir. 1985) (Rubin, J., dissenting from denial of rehear-
ing en banc) ("the panel erred"); see, eg., Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1330-32 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(Bork, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane) (panel decision was "plainly wrong" and
created an intracircuit conflict), aff'd sub nor. Mentor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986);
Bartlett ex rel Neuman v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1240, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (statement of Bork, Starr,
Buckley, Williams, & D. Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (panel decisions
were "clearly wrong" and involved issues "of exceptional importance"); International Olympic
Committee v. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 789 F.2d 1319, 1320 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane) (panel erred and "the result reached threatens a poten-
tially serious and widespread infringement of personal liberties"), aff'd sub nom. San Francisco Arts
& Athletics Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 107 S. Ct. 2971 (1987).
99. See FED. R. App. P. 35.
100. N.Y.U. Note, supra note 17, at 569-74.
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ience to permit the full circuit to decide more cases; 10 1 they are not free actors,
but rather representatives of the circuit.
Professors Lewis Kornhauser and Lawrence Sager have recently analyzed
how multi-member courts can act consistently and coherently.' 0 2 One model of
uniform decision making is that of representation where, in their terminology,
the "active group, a small subset of the reference group, is expected to reach a
result that emulates the result that would be reached by another group (the ref-
erence group) if the latter undertook to decide the matter."' 1 3 The "principal
measure of performance in a representative decision making process," they con-
tinue, is "the tendency of the active decision making group to arrive at results
that would have been reached by the process' reference group.
While Kornhauser and Sager do not specifically address en bane decisions,
their analysis applies usefully to that process. If the reference group (the full
circuit) has no ability or only a limited ability to review decisions of the active
group (the panel), and the active group is randomly selected, then the decision
making method fails to be one of representation. To fulfill the goals of the repre-
sentation model, we permit a majority of the full circuit to overrule the panel, if
and when it so desires. An "incorrect" panel decision seems to be the best, not
the worst, reason for the circuit to act in a representation model. Judge Henry
Friendly in his discussion of the social science evidence outlined above, has sug-
gested, in a related context, that if there really were voting blocs on the federal
circuits, en bancs should be used more, not less; otherwise, a minority of the
judges could control the law of the circuit. 10 5 It is also worth noting that the
Supreme Court always sits en banc,' 06 although there is apparently no constitu-
tional or statutory prohibition to the Court sitting in panels. 10 7 Presumably, one
reason for this practice is to prevent active groups (panels) of the Supreme Court
from committing error.
The problem with the representational model is that it proves too much. If
the model is fully enforced, every decision of a circuit should be en banced to
101. R. POSNER, supra note 30, at 12.
102. Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 52.
103. Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 52, at 89.
104. Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 52, at 91. Kornhauser and Sager also discuss judgment
and preference aggregation as models of group decision-making. Id. at 84-89. The measure of per-
formance of these models is, respectively, "accuracy: the tendency of a group decision-making pro-
cess to reach 'correct' results," and "authenticity," which they define as "the ability of a particular
process to reflect correctly the preferences of the members of the decision-making group." Id. at 91.
Both goals are served by the en bane process. It promotes "accuracy" by increasing the number of
decision makers, which increases the likelihood that the court will reach a correct result (as defined
by judgment aggregation). See id. at 98; infra text accompanying notes 111-12. Likewise, "authen-
ticity," similar to the representation model, will more likely result from the improved quality of
deliberation from a larger panel. Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 52, at 96 n.18.
105. Friendly, Of Voting Blocs, and Cabbages and Kings, 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 673, 675 (1973); see
also Atkins, supra note 44, at 626 (rotating panels facilitate expression of minority views).
106. R. POSNER, supra note 30, at 11.
107. Such a proposal was considered and rejected by the Freund Report in 1972. See Federal
Judicial Center, Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court, 57 F.R.D. 573,
580-89, 611 (1972).
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avoid the risk of error among panels.108 This places paramount value on repre-
sentation. At least implicitly, the drafters of rule 35 appeared to give equal or
greater weight to values such as panel finality and judicial economy. Had they
thought otherwise, the drafters presumably would not have placed any substan-
tive limits on the process, as they did in developing the rule. Thus, one can
argue that a panel's "mere error" is not enough to en bane the decision, unless it
creates an intracircuit conflict or involves an issue of "exceptional importance."
Moreover, allowing limitless en bane review fosters a mode of judicial deci-
sion making condemned by most legal discourse, or at least identified as a pur-
portedly inescapable and presumably unfortunate phenomenon. In current legal
scholarship, judges thought to be applying neutral principles of law in a princi-
pled fashion stand buffeted, on opposite sides of the political spectrum, by the
Critical Legal Studies adherents and the law-and-economics school, both of
whom argue in part that judges act, to varying degrees, on personal prefer-
ences. 109 Many judges vehemently deny this charge. 110 Professors Kornhauser
and Sager appear to side at with the aspirations of the judges, observing that
"[m]ost jurisprudential theories of adjudication consider adjudication, at least
implicitly, to be the rendering of a judgment rather than the expression of a
judicial preference."' 1  A preference "speaks only to [the judge's] own values
and advantage;" in contrast, a "judgment advances a 'truth,' that is, a proposi-
tion to which all other right-thinking persons who may confront the issue must
adhere." 1
12
Despite the skepticism of Legal Realism and its progeny, judgment aggre-
gation and principled decision making remain the great quest of the legal com-
munity. This quest can be carried on in a sophisticated manner, as it has been in
constitutional law. In that sphere, few if any defend the propriety of a judge
relying only on her own preferences or values in reaching a decision. 113 En bane
review without limits or guidelines would inject a heavy dose of capriciousness
into the appellate process. Since, as a practical matter, all decisions will not be
en banced, litigants and judges could only guess what panel opinions will receive
108. Beatty v. Chesapeake Center, Inc., 835 F.2d 71, 74 n.* (4th Cir. 1987) (en bane) (Winter,
C.J., concurring).
109. See Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 52, at 84 n.3 (summarizing both schools of thought,
with appropriate citations); R. POSNER, supra note 60, at 505-06 (developing economic approach);
see also Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1986) (arguing ultimate similarity in
conclusions of both schools of thought).
110. Edwards, Public Misperceptions Concerning the "Politics" of Judging: Dispelling Some
Myths About the D.C Circuit, 56 U. COLO. L. REv. 619, 634-35 (1985) (most cases decided in a
"principled fashion"); eg., Friendly, supra note 105, at 677 (incorrect to assume "that judges regu-
larly vote on ideological lines; it is only in the closest cases that such attitudes may tip the balance");
Rubin, Does Law Matter? A Judge's Response to the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 37 J. LEGAL
ED. 307, 307-08 (1987) ("My conclusions are that legal doctrine is a real force, judges follow it, and
they decide all but a small fraction of the cases that come before them in accordance with what they
perceive to be the controlling legal rules.").
111. Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 52, at 84 n.3.
112. Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 52, at 85.
113. For sharp criticism of such judicial actions, see J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 44-48 (1980); R. POSNER, supra note 30, at 203-05. Explicit advo-
cacy of judges relying solely on their own values seems quite rare. J. ELY, supra, at 44 n.7.
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en bane treatment. Absent any objective criteria, the selection of cases for en
bane review will simply become a function of the judge's personal agenda.
1 14
The two criteria found in rule 35 attempt to save us from this prospect.
Awaiting further examination is how objective or principled these criteria are,
and how can they be made more so. Despite some difficulties, 115 it seems fairly
easy to identify conflicting panel decisions within a circuit. But how are cases of
"exceptional importance" to be identified? That ambiguous criterion eventually
could collapse into one of personal preference vague enough to include even
"mere" erroneous decisions by a panel. Indeed, one circuit judge has said pri-
vately, with tongue only slightly in cheek, that he knows an "exceptionally im-
portant" decision when he sees one. Some writers despair of ever being able to
produce more objective factors, and accordingly call for drastic curtailment of
the en bane process. 1 6 The project, however, is not an impossible one, and it is
addressed in the following section.
D. Toward Principled Criteria for Selecting Cases Worthy of En Banc Review
Any appellate court system that establishes discretionary review of cases
presents a problem of which cases to review. The courts of appeals hear most of
their cases by way of litigants' right to appeal; the en bane procedure, a type of
second tier review within the same court, is discretionary. Likewise, almost all
of the cases the Supreme Court hears are the product of discretionary, selective
review.'17 Lately there has been much interest in the Supreme Court's bur-
geoning caseload and the problems it faces in only selecting about three percent
of its docketed cases for plenary review. 8 A survey of some of the proposed
solutions to those problems serves to illustrate the analogous issues faced in lim-
iting en bane review.
Supreme Court Rule 17 ostensibly governs Court selection of cases. It is
remarkably similar to Federal Appellate Rule 35. The Court's rule states that
the Court will exercise its certiorari jurisdiction to resolve conflicts between the
circuits or between federal appellate courts and a state court of last resort, or to
decide "an important question of federal law which has not been, but should be,
114. See S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT'S ROLE: A THEORY
OF MANAGING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL PROCESS 107 (1986) ("The lack of case selection criteria
not only muddles the Court's role but also aggravates the ever-present inclination of the Justices to
conceive of the case selection process in political terms."). For a summary and discussion of the
political science literature which purports to document this inclination, see S. GOLDMAN & T.
JAHNIGE, supra note 43, at 103-07. For judicial comment, see Falwell v. Flynt, 805 F.2d 484, 489
(4th Cir. 1986) (Winter, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane) ("Why, when the court
has freely granted rehearings in bane in recent years in many less significant cases, it declines to do
so here, is inexplicable."), rev'd on other grounds, 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988).
115. See supra note 53 (judges disagree as to whether panel decisions conflict).
116. J. HOWARD, supra note 30, at 217-18 (summarizing interviews of circuit judges); MICH.
Note, supra note 1, at 1648 & n.63.
117. See generally Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE L. J. 62
(1985) (examining discretionary restrictions on appeal as of right and suggesting such appeals be
abandoned for certain types of cases).
118. S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, supra note 114, at 1; Hellman, Case Selection in the Burger
Court: A Preliminary Inquiry, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 947, 948-52 (1985); see also Statistical
Recap of Supreme Court's Workload During Last Three Terms, 57 U.S.L.W. 3074 (July 26, 1988).
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settled by this Court." 119 Finding this rule to be "indeterminate," Professors
Samuel Estreicher and John Sexton recently suggested a "managerial model" for
case selection. 120
In brief, their model encompasses the following. In a federal system of
courts, some disuniformity of decisions is expected, tolerable, and sometimes
even beneficial (because an issue can "percolate" and undergo thorough analysis
in lower courts).121 Like any good manager, Estreicher and Sexton continue,
the Court must delegate federal law adjudication to lower federal and state
courts, and only on rare occasions should the Court step in and make a correc-
tion or adjustment.122 They divide these occasions into a "priority" docket and
a "discretionary" docket. The former includes cases involving intolerable inter-
circuit conflicts, direct conflict with Supreme Court precedent, resolution of ver-
tical federalism disputes, interbranch disputes, and interstate disputes. 123 A
"discretionary" docket includes cases that can serve as vehicles for the develop-
ment of federal law or involve interference with federal executive responsibility,
the Court's supervisory power, or incorrect consideration of a federal issue.
124
Cases that do not fall into one of these categories, absent further reasons, should
not be reviewed.125
These criteria should not be utilized by the courts of appeals in deciding
whether to en banc cases. Rather, they are illustrative of attempts to give princi-
pled content to gatekeeping criteria. An analogous effort, however, can and
should be made with respect to Federal Appellate Rule 35. One should begin by
reviewing the purposes and functions of the federal courts of appeals. It is
widely acknowledged that these courts serve both an "error correction" and a
"law development" function. 126 In the former role the courts of appeals correct
a trial court's error in applying settled law to fairly routine fact situations. Law
development involves something more-the creation or extension of law in new
factual areas, or the interpretation of vague federal constitutional or statutory
provisions. By definition, law creation will almost always apply to more cases
than the case immediately under consideration.
127
The function of courts of appeals can serve as a starting point for objec-
tively selecting which panel decisions deserve en banc treatment. In particular
they aid in solving the "mere disagreement" conundrum. 128 The ultimate issue,
119. Sup. Cr. R. 17.
120. S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, supra note 114, at 43.
121. S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, supra note 114, at 48.
122. S. ESTREiCHER & J. SEXTON, supra note 114, at 50-52.
123. S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, supra note 114, at 52-62.
124. S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, supra note 114, at 62-69.
125. S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, supra note 114, at 69-70.
126. S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, supra note 114, at 4-5, 56; Hellman, supra note 118, at 959-
60. The Supreme Court should rarely serve an error correction role. S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON,
supra note 114, at 4-5 & 56.
127. See, eg., R. MARTINEAU, supra note 17, at 19-21; R. MARTINEAU, supra note 73, at 5-30;
R. POSNER, supra note 30, at 12-13; Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The
Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARv. L. REv. 542, 551-54 (1969);
Resnik, supra note 61, at 868.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 96-113.
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we now see, is what one means by "error." If the panel error is one requiring
correction in the application of settled law to more-or-less routine factual situa-
tions, then the need to impose the burdens of en bane review is scarcely justified.
Even if the panel is wrong, it only affects the individual litigants. On the other
hand, if the error is perceived to be one of law creation, then it will affect many
cases and en bane review can be justified. When one reviews the en bane case
law, it turns out that many, 129 though not all, 130 judges understand this differ-
ence. Indeed, the dissenters in the District of Columbia Circuit opinions re-
ferred to both the error of the panels and the importance of the issues to the
Circuit. 
13 1
While helpful, labeling the court's role in a case as one of correcting an
error or developing the law is ultimately unsatisfactory. At the outset, it seems
too easy to accomplish. Any two cases are rarely identical, and even applying
settled law to those cases might suggest that the law is being extended or re-
stricted, and thus applicable to more than one case. Expressed another way, at a
high level of generality, one can very easily assert that a purportedly incorrect
panel decision involves law creation rather than an error in application of law.
Likewise, someone unhappy with a panel decision could easily convert it into an
intracircuit conflict by claiming that the second panel, by law creation, departed
from a prior panel.
Moreover, rule 35 seems to require something more than reference to law
creation. The rule refers both to securing and maintaining "uniformity of deci-
129. See supra note 97; Serpas v. Schmidt, 827 F.2d 23, 40 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane) ("The questions of principle glossed over by the panel's
opinion are far more important than the outcome of this case, and they are worth the extra judicial
time necessary to get them right..), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 1075 (1988); Rakovich v. Wade, 850 F.2d
1179, 1180 (7th Cir. 1987) (Ripple & Cudahy J.J. dissenting from grant of rehearing en bane) (re-
hearing en bane should not be granted since case is a "fact-specific adjudication of civil liability
imposed by a jury verdict."); Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 779 F.2d 1129, 1130 (5th Cir. 1986)
(Higginbothom & Jones, JJ., concurring in denial of rehearing en bane) (panel was wrong but the
decision was "responsive to a unique fact situation."), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 1364 (1987); see also
Church of Scientology v. IRS, 792 F.2d 153, 155 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (en bane) (Scalia, J.)
("[A]ppellate review serves a dual purpose: the correction of legal error and the establishment of
legal rules for future guidance. Only the latter is ordinarily worthy of the attention of the full
court."), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 271 (1987); Dahl v. Pinter, 794 F.2d 1016, 1016 (5th Cir. 1986) (Jones, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane) (panel decided issue of law, not merely applying settled
law to facts), vacated and remanded, 108 S. Ct. 2063 (1988); Easterbrook, Agreement Among the
Justices: An Empirical Note, 1984 Sup. Cr. REV. 389, 390 ("The Court's main function is to settle
disputes about legal principles .... We would like to know whether today's dissent shows a separate
rationale (and thus augurs differences in future cases) or stems from circumstances peculiar to the
case.").
130. See supra note 98; see also United States v. Singleton, 763 F.2d 1432, 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(Wright, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (stresses importance of case to individual
criminal defendants); Church of Scientology v. Foley, 640 F.2d 1335, 1341 n.46 (D.C. Cir.) (Robin-
son, Edwards & R. Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) ("In the exceptional
case, however, an en bane rehearing may be appropriate to cure gross individual injustice."), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 10-16; Bartlett ex rel. Neuman v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1240,
1247 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (joint statement of Bork, Starr, Buckley, Williams & D. Ginsburg, JJ., dissent-
ing from denial of rehearing en bane) ("Each [case] involves an issue of exceptional importance and,
as we demonstrate below, each received a panel resolution that we think is clearly wrong, and is, at
the very least, highly dubious.").
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sions" and the need to decide "a question of exceptional importance."' 132 It does
not simply refer to conflicts among panel decisions, nor simply "important" is-
sues. Those criteria are qualified: the first states that "consideration by the full
court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity," suggesting that panel con-
flicts are to be neither discovered lightly, nor necessarily resolved by the full
court even if uncovered.133 Similarly, the use of the word "exceptional" implies
that "important" decisions abound via law creation, but only the uniquely im-
portant ones ought to be en banced. 134 For these reasons, a somewhat more
detailed explication of the rule 35 criteria is necessary, a task the following
paragraphs undertake.
1. Intracircuit Conflicts
Given the rule followed in most circuits that one panel cannot overrule an
earlier panel from the same circuit,1 35 one would expect the uniformity criterion
of rule 35 rarely to be employed. Apparently, lack of uniformity is still per-
ceived to be a problem, generated by the increasing number of judges and cases
within each circuit. 136 Intracircuit communication is also hampered by the
large number of opinions filed and limited publication rules.137 Moreover, the
vagueness of many areas of federal law such as fourth amendment probable
cause issues 138 is likely to lead to different results in factually similar cases.
As suggested above, however, it is relatively easy to divine conflict between
two or more panel decisions, especially if conflict is desired or expected. There
132. FED. R. APP. P. 35 (emphasis added).
133. Id.
134. Id. Some might argue that absolving fact specific cases from en banc treatment removes a
powerful incentive for a randomly selected panel to reach the decision which would have been
reached by the full circuit. Absent this ex ante deterrent, the idiosyncrasies of the panel and the
effect of random selection are magnified. Moreover, a circuit arguably should be concerned with the
use, by panels, of major premises (i.e., settled law) in order to maintain uniformity of panel reason-
ing. See Serpas v. Schmidt, 827 F.2d 23, 34-40 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1075 (1988); Beatty v. Chesapeake Center, Inc.,
835 F.2d 71, 74-75 (4th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (Murnaghan, J., concurring); Easterbrook, supra note
129, at 390.
Admittedly, regardless of the ultimate result, the reasoning of a panel in a fact-specific case can
have precedential effect. Cf. Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C.L. REv. 367, 376-83 (1988)
(both doctrine and underlying precedent create precedent). Further there is merit to the argument
that a litigant should not have to be subject to the vagaries of a panel when the full circuit would
have reached another result. Beatty v. Chesapeake Center, Inc., 835 F.2d 71, 75 n.1 (4th Cir. 1987)
(en bane) (Murnaghan, J., concurring) ("It is distasteful to me to see the work of the court take on
the guise of a roulette wheel operated by chance."). Justice to individual litigants perhaps should not
always be sacrificed to the economies of never en bancing "law-application" cases. See supra text
accompanying notes 128-32. Cf. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 108 S. Ct. 1419, 1421 (1988)
(per curiam) (ordering reargument) (discussing "abiding rule that it treat all litigants equally").
These factors must be used, if at all, with great caution, since it is difficult to distinguish cases which
should be en banced, and those that should not. Otherwise, the only constant is the voting behavior
of a majority of the circuit, which this Article argues is not, by itself, a sufficient reason to en banc a
panel decision.
135. See supra text accompanying note 37.
136. See Wasby, supra note 30, at 1353 (reporting interviews of Ninth Circuit judges). But cf
MICH. Note, supra note 1, at 1647 & n.55 (survey ofjudges from each circuit indicated that uniform-
ity was a secondary concern to importance in making a decision to en banc).
137. S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXToN, supra note 114, at 133.
138. R. POSNER, supra note 30, at 19; Wasby, supra note 30, at 1357-59.
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is no magic formula to identify valid intracircuit conflicts that deserve en banc
resolution. Addressing a similar issue, Professors Estreicher and Sexton sug-
gested that intercircuit conflicts subject to Supreme Court review should be only
those that are direct and intolerable, that lead to shopping among circuits for a
forum, or inhibit planning in the absence of a nationally binding rule. 139 In
addition conflicts on a particular point may be permitted to "percolate" among
the circuits prior to resolution, because the percolating exploration of different
factual and legal approaches will ultimately aid the Supreme Court if and when
it resolves the conflict.
14 °
Similar criteria could help identify intolerable intracircuit conflicts. If
panels purport not to overrule or disregard prior panel decisions, then explicit
conflicts should be few indeed, 14 1 but through accident or design, conflicts can
arise within a circuit. A true conflict, as defined here, involves express hold-
ings-not dicta or alternative rulings-in an area of law creation, as best as can
be determined. In the intracircuit context, where forum shopping is not an is-
sue, explicit disagreement would mean two or more lines of decision that are
irreconcilable and confusing to both district courts and appellate panels. This
confusion may not become clear until the issue percolates within the circuit, at
both the trial and appellate levels, and unless the disagreement is explicit, the
"conflict" should not be resolved until and unless it becomes intolerable.
Two examples can serve to illustrate how apparent intracircuit-circuit con-
flicts do not and need not result in en banc resolution. For years there has been
some uncertainty in the Sixth Circuit as to which test applies under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).142 Early cases held that ADEA
plaintiffs could not recover unless they could show that age "made a difference"
in the adverse employment decision. 143 Later panels, however, held that ADEA
cases should be governed by the same shifting burden-of-proof standards used in
Title VII cases. 144 To the extent this "conflict" was even acknowledged, it was
variously said that the tests were simply two ways of stating the same principle,
or that different types of proof might call for different tests. 14 5 The "conflict" is
apparently troublesome but not intolerable at the district court level; for exam-
139. S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, supra note 114, at 57.
140. S. ESrRECHER & J. SEXTON, supra note 114, at 48.
141. Those circuits, however, that do not by rule or case law require one panel to follow earlier
panels may experience more explicit conflicts, though stare decisis may ameliorate the problem.
142. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982).
143. Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 317 (6th Cir. 1975).
144. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982), applied in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973); Chappell v. GTE Prods. Corp., 803 F.2d 261, 265-66 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
1375 (1987); Wilkins v. Eaton Corp., 790 F.2d 515, 520 (6th Cir. 1986); Williams v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 770 F.2d 47, 51-52 (6th Cir. 1985) (Krapansky, J., concurring); Kendall v. Hoover Co.,
751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir. 1984); Davis v. Combustion Eng'g., Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 920 (6th Cir.
1984).
145. Simpson v. Midland-Ross Corp., 823 F.2d 937, 940-42 (6th Cir. 1987) (review on case-by-
case basis); Merkel v. Scovill, Inc., 787 F.2d 174, 177 (6th Cir. 1986) (review on case-by-case basis),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 990 (1987); LaGrant v. Gulf& Western Mfg. Co., 748 F.2d 1087, 1090-91 (6th
Cir. 1984) (depends on type of evidence); Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp., 696 F.2d 1176, 1179-81 (6th
Cir. 1983) (review on case-by-case basis); Rose v. National Cash Register Corp., 703 F.2d 225, 277
(6th Cir. 1983) ("slightly different formulations"), cert denied, 464 U.S. 939 (1984).
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pie, in the Southern District of Ohio several district judges incorporate both tests
into jury instructions or their own decisions.146 Continued percolation of this
issue may show the conflict to be real, necessitating en bane review, or it may
show that both judges and the bar find the present approach to be acceptable. 147
A second example comes from the Seventh Circuit. In 1985 Judge Richard Pos-
ner wrote an opinion proposing and applying a mathematical formula to deter-
mine whether district judges should grant preliminary injunctions. 148 A
dissenting judge on that panel opined that this new test differed from prior Sev-
enth Circuit cases.1 49 Later and different panels held that Judge Posner's
formula was simply another, more sophisticated statement of the traditional eq-
uity standards that govern issuance of injunctions.' 5 0 There was said to be no
inconsistency in the various panel decisions. Despite some voices to the con-
trary,151 the "conflict" apparently has never become intolerably confusing either
to district courts or the Seventh Circuit itself. The "conflict" has not been "re-
solved" via the en bane process and probably never will be.
A final issue under the rubric of intracircuit uniformity arises when a panel
produces a confusing opinion, produces three opinions, or cannot reach a result.
Even if the issues involved are not necessarily of "exceptional importance," en
bane resolution seems appropriate to serve both litigants and intracircuit har-
mony. 1 52 In those rare cases where this happens en bane review is an appropri-
ate corrective tool under the uniformity criterion of rule 35.153
2. Questions of Exceptional Importance
Some ways to identify panel decisions of genuine "exceptional importance"
have already been suggested. 154 Such decisions are usually the product of law
creation; that is, they formulate legal principles which will apply to a variety of
factual scenarios that are likely to recur in many cases at the district and appel-
late court level. If a decision creates law, the majority of the circuit is entitled to
examine the issue presented de novo. The case law sometimes reflects this un-
146. See Strong v. Xenia City Schools, No. C-3-86-407 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (on file with author)
(Laugesen language used in jury instructions due to existence of direct evidence of age discrimina-
tion); Dunn v. Dayton Multi-Punch, C-3-82-110 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (on file with author) (jury instruc-
tions include both tests).
147. Some judges still find the divergent approaches troubling and apparently would opt for a
single, clearer standard. Klein v. Stop-N-Go, 824 F.2d 453, 453 (6th Cir. 1987) (Krupansky, J.,
dissenting); Blackwell v. Sun Electric Corp., 696 F.2d 1176, 1187-88 (6th Cir. 1983) (Krupansky, J.,
dissenting); Locke v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 205, 207-08 (6th Cir. 1982) (Jones, J.,
dissenting).
148. American Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hospital Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 1986).
149. Id. at 604, 609 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
150. Lawson Prod., Inc. v. Avnet, Inc., 782 F.2d 1429, 1432-34 (7th Cir. 1986); Brunswick
Corp. v. Jones, 784 F.2d 271, 274 n.1 (7th Cir. 1986). Even Judge Posner seems to agree. Centurion
Reinsurance Co. v. Singer, 810 F.2d 140, 143 (7th Cir. 1987) (majority opinion written by Posner,
J.).
151. Eg., Mullenix, supra note 61, at 551-56.
152. FORDHAM Comment, supra note 1, at 416-17; N.Y.U. Note, supra note 17, at 592-93.
153. Eg., Central States S.E-& S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Kraftco, Inc., 799 F.2d 1098, 1104
(6th Cir. 1986) (en bane) (reviewing panel which produced three opinions), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
1291 (1987). This was the only such case found in the sample discussed infra Part III.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 123-36, 139-40.
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derstanding of en bane importance.1 55
As with the issue of circuit uniformity, further delineation of what is or is
not exceptionally important beyond general statements of law creation is not
likely to be terribly fruitful. Nevertheless, case law suggests some further expli-
cation of the "importance" criterion. Before turning to that, however, two argu-
ments casting doubt on the usefulness of the importance criterion should be
addressed. First, the Second Circuit has developed the approach that the more
important the case, the less deserving of en bane review it is. The reasoning is
that truly important cases will be resolved by the Supreme Court. 156 Whatever
merit this idea had when it first arose in the 1960s, it seems little justified today.
The Supreme Court has great difficulty in deciding which cases among its bur-
geoning caseload to review; many "important" cases presumably go unreviewed.
Thus, it is no longer tenable, if it ever was, to shift en bane responsibility to the
Supreme Court.157 This factor should no longer be exclusively used.
A second argument suggests that courts should consider if other circuits
have addressed the issue. If one or more have, and the panel has followed the
trend of the other circuits, then the circuit should be reluctant to en bane the
panel decision. The reason is that if the other circuits have considered the issue
(perhaps by en bane), it has already been explored by other judges and the addi-
tional resources of en bane are less necessary. 158 On the other hand, if the panel
155. See, ag., Aguillard v. Edwards, 778 F.2d 225, 227 (5th Cir. 1985) (Gee, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en bane) ("I await with interest the application of this new mode of constitutional
analysis to other statutes."), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987); Johnson v. Heckler, 776 F.2d 166, 167
(7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane) (en bane review "af-
fects tens of thousands of administrative law cases every year and deserves review independently"),
vacated and remanded sub. nom. Bowen v. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. 3202 (1987); McCray v. Abrams, 756
F.2d 277, 278 (2d Cir. 1985) (Winter, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane) (panel decision
"affects the manner in which juries are selected in every criminal case in the state or federal courts
within this circuit"), cert granted and remanded, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986).
156. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1021 (2d Cir. 1973) (Mansfield, J.,
concurring in denial of rehearing en bane), vacated and remanded, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); see also
Kaufman, supra note 5, at 57. But see IBM v. United States, 480 F.2d 293, 304 (2d Cir. 1973) (en
bane) (Timbers, J., dissenting) cert. denied, 416 U.S. 979 (1974).
This rationale is occasionally mentioned in other circuits. Eg., Bartlett ex rel. Neuman v.
Bowen, 824 F.2d 1240, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Silberman, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en
bane) ("The question will surely eventually be resolved by the Supreme Court and, in the meantime,
I doubt very much whether the work of this court will be seriously affected by our refusal to rehear
the case.").
The likelihood of the Supreme Court deciding that case, or resolving the issue presented by the
case, is not a wholly irrelevant factor. If the likelihood is strong, especially if the Court has granted
review to a case raising the same issue then en bancing the panel decision seems unnecessary. Cf
Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1227-29 (7th Cir. 1988) (en bane) (Ripple, J., dissenting)
(court should not decide case until Supreme Court has rendered a decision in a similar case); Wolfe
v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 800 F.2d 1032 (11th Cir. 1986) (en bane), vacated, 107 S. Ct. 3205 (1987)
(whether securities act claims are subject to arbitration; issue was in conflict among the circuits at
time of Wolfe and was eventually resolved by Supreme Court in Shearson/American Express v.
McMahan, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987)); Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 813 F.2d 198, 209-11 (9th Cir.
1986) (Schroeder, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) ("takings" issue addressed by
Supreme Court in three cases in 1987). See generally FORDHAM Comment, supra note 1, at 415-16
(discussing the issue of "importance" and Supreme Court's resolution of "important" cases; MICH.
Note, supra note 1, at 1652 (criticizing Eisen & Carlisle v. Jacquelin).
157. N.Y.U. Note, supra note 17, at 581-82.
158. See R. POSNER, supra note 30, at 256 (suggesting that other circuits be followed in situation
described, though not mentioning en bane issue). But see Riddle v. Secretary of Health & Human
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has not followed the other circuits, then en banc review may be appropriate.
Some suggest that cases of importance to that circuit are appropriate for en
banc review. "Cases of importance" would be those that recur frequently in a
circuit or are of particular significance to litigants or the bar generally in the
circuit. Thus, certain types of cases are sometimes said to be important to a
certain circuit: securities regulation in the Second;159 admiralty in the Fifth;' 60
labor or antitrust in the Sixth or Seventh; 161 immigration or copyright/en-
tertainment in the Ninth; 162 and administrative law in the District of Colum-
bia.163 Judge Silberman of the District of Columbia Circuit mentioned this as a
particularly appropriate factor to consider when deciding whether to en banc a
case.164 This factor, while useful, should not be carried too far, because by itself
it would justify en bancing all of those cases within the circuit. The regional
importance should only be considered in conjunction with other indicia of
importance.
165
Other authorities mention governance of the bar or the integrity of the judi-
cial process as other factors to consider in selecting what cases to en banc. t6 6
Questions of how attorneys litigate cases before trial and appellate tribunals obvi-
ously affect all non-pro se cases and seem apt for en bane treatment. Given the
apparent paucity of these types of cases, en banc treatment should not unduly
drain the courts' resources. Once again, bar governance ought to be considered
Servs., 817 F.2d 1238 (6th Cir.) (panel decision followed other circuits), rehearing en bane granted,
823 F.2d 164 (6th Cir. 1987).
159. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969).'
160. Hagerty v. L. & L. Marine Services, Inc., 797 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1986) (Jolly, I., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en bane) (Jones Act); see also Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750
F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1985) (en bane) (working conditions at a ship-building company), cert. denied,
478 U.S. 10 (1986).
161. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 823 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir. 1987) (en bane) (labor
preemption), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 1877 (1988); Illinois ex rel. Hartigan v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line
Co., 852 F.2d 891 (7th Cir. 1988) (en bane) (antitrust case); Crounse Corp. v. ICC, 787 F.2d 1031,
1032 (6th Cir.) (Jones & Merritt, JJ., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane) (antitrust), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 890 (1986).
162. Contreras-Aragon v. I.N.S., 852 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1988) (en bane); International
Olympic Comm. v. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 789 F.2d 1319, 1323 n.4 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kozin-
ski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane) (copyright case), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 2971 (1987).
163. Securities Indus. Ass'n. v. Comptroller, 765 F.2d 1196, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane) (per curiam), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986).
164. See supra text accompanying note 15.
165. See generally N.Y.U. Note, supra note 17, at 587-88 (where a region is a significant locus of
certain activity, that circuit's decision on such activity may have national importance). Another
caveat is that "regional importance" should mean affecting the entire circuit, or arising from one
state primarily but affecting the whole region or the nation, or recurring in the circuit. Securities
regulation cases in the Second Circuit, which arise almost exclusively from New York City, would
be an example of this second type. Issues clearly affecting only one state would normally not. See In
re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans 821 F.2d 1147, 1169 n.38 (5th Cir. 1987) (en bane) (stating
that en bane court will not review panel's resolution of one state's conflicts of law issue); Jackson v.
Johns Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1329 (5th Cir. 1985) (en bane) (Rubin, J., concurring)
("I think that diversity cases should not be reheard en bane."), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986).
166. See In re Discipline of Ashton, 769 F.2d 168, 169 (3d Cir. 1985) (Adams, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en bane) (bar governance); MIcH. Note, supra note 1, at 1654-55; see also
supra text accompanying note 56.
[Vol. 67
EN BANC REVIEW
only in conjunction with other factors to decide whether to en banc a panel
decision.
The list of cases not covered by these factors is a long one, and it should be
if limits on en bancing are to be meaningful: factually unique cases involving
mere correction of errors; "controversial," or "big" cases; 167 or cases that strike
a judge as creating a particular injustice. 168 Even if a case is particularly com-
pelling for the litigants, involves large sums of money, or seems especially inter-
esting or noteworthy to the judge, these factors alone should not be
determinative. Otherwise, the judge's personal agenda will be projected upon
rule 35. This standard would preclude, for example, automatically en bancing
death penalty or abortion cases. 169
3. Intercircuit Conflicts
Deciding whether and when to resolve intercircuit conflicts is an issue of
great interest to the Supreme Court. It can also be relevant to en bancing a
panel decision which creates or perpetuates such a conflict. Authority exists for
the proposition that circuits should en banc such panel decisions. 170 Indeed the
Ninth Circuit has a rule that expressly permits en bancing when the panel deci-
sion creates an intercircuit conflict. 171 Other writers, though, suggest that one
circuit should not en banc simply because another circuit has reached a different
result. 172
On balance the en banc process can play a useful role in aiding the Supreme
Court to resolve intercircuit conflicts. The language of rule 35 is no obstacle;
167. See N.Y.U. Note, supra note 17, at 590.
168. Compare United States v. Samuels, 808 F.2d 1298, 1299-1300 (8th Cir. 1987) (Lay, C.J.,
concurring in denial of rehearing en bane) (panel reversal of conviction of man who threatened to
kill President did not meet rule 35 criteria) with id. at 1302 (Fagg, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en bane) (panel reversal appropriate for rehearing en bane).
169. But see MICH. Note, supra note 1, at 1649 & n.71 (suggesting that "cases involving sensitive
political issues" should be en banced). As the Note correctly concludes, id. at 1650-5 1, this criterion
is far too vague to be justifiable. See also S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, supra note 114, at 69 (every
death penalty case should not automatically be reviewed by the Supreme Court).
170. E.g., Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 813 F.2d 198, 209-11 (9th Cir. 1987) (Schroeder, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1120 (1988); Pangilinan v. INS,
809 F.2d 1449, 1450-55 (9th Cir. 1987) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc),
rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 2210 (1988); Christian Science Reading Room v. City & County of San Francisco,
807 F.2d 1466, 1467-78 (9th Cir. 1986) (Norris, 3., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane), cert
denied, 479 U.S. 1066 (1987); EEOC v. Franklin & Marshall College, 775 F.2d 110, 122 (3d Cir.
1985) (Adams, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane); Uviedo v. Steves Sash & Door Co.,
760 F.2d 87, 88-89 (5th Cir. 1985) (Rubin, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane), cert
denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986); Wilsey v. Eddingfield, 780 F.2d 614, 617-20 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1130 (1986); Financial Instit.
Employees Local No. 1182 v. NLRB, 750 F.2d 757, 758 (9th Cir. 1985) (Kennedy, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc).
171. 9TH CIR. R. 12(b).
172. Browning v. Clerk, United States House of Representatives, 793 F.2d 380, 381 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (R. Ginsburg, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc); cf. Freeman v. Rideout, 826 F.2d
194, 195 (2d Cir. 1987) (Oakes, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (panel decision
should be reviewed because it creates an intracircuit-circuit conflict, despite fact that it followed
another circuit), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1273 (1988); R. POSNER, supra note 30, at 256-57 (due to
burdens of en bane proceeding, does not "agree with the suggestion that a circuit should not be
permitted to go into conflict with another circuit except in an en banc proceeding").
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while it does not refer to intercircuit conflict, surely the "exceptional impor-
tance" criterion is malleable enough to cover certain issues of both circuit and
national importance. Intercircuit conflict certainly is and remains a problem for
the Supreme Court. In recent years almost one-third of its docket has consisted
of such cases,173 and many other intercircuit conflicts go unreviewed by the
Court. 174
The problem of intercircuit conflicts does exist; the issue is whether the en
banc process should explicitly exist to undertake the task of resolving the prob-
lem. Arguably it can, if panels are in fact en banced only along the lines previ-
ously suggested in this Article. Sensible use of objective criteria should leave
enough room on the "natural" en banc docket to relieve pressure on the
Supreme Court to resolve intercircuit conflicts. It may not be cost-beneficial,
however, to require any circuit to en banc before permitting a panel to create a
conflict with another circuit.
Judge Posner persuasively argues that one circuit's panel decision should
not trigger ripples of en banc decisions in other circuits if the other circuits wish
to disagree. 175 Given the understandable reluctance of most judges to en banc,
other circuits making a subsequent decision will have incentives not to create
conflicts. One might think this to be a useful incentive to lessen such conflicts,
but conflicts are not necessarily bad. There is no a priori reason a first circuit's
decision is correct, and en bancing all circuits that wish to disagree in the future
will diminish the aforementioned benefits of circuit percolation. As Judge Pos-
ner suggests, these concerns can be met by requiring a circuit to en banc to
create a conflict, but only when at least three other circuits have decided the
issue the same way. 176 This should be added as a final factor in deciding
whether to en banc a panel decision. 177
F. Stating the Reasons for En Banc Review
A final prescriptive device suggested by some is to require en banc courts to
state why an en banc, rather than a panel decision, is necessary.1 78 Perhaps this
would temper the unjustified use of the device, since it would open to criticism
by the legal community those en banc decisions lacking genuine justification or
stating only contrived bases. One judge suggested to me, however, that such a
requirement is likely to have little impact. Purportedly "justifiable" reasons to
en banc any given panel are fairly easy to concieve, he said, and for years the
Supreme Court has not been giving reasons for review in many of its
opinions.
1 79
I am not as pessimistic as the judge. Requiring written reasons would po-
173. Hellman, supra note 118, at 1015.
174. S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, supra note 114, at 137-52.
175. R. POSNER, supra note 30, at 256-57.
176. R. POSNER, supra note 30, at 256-57.
177. See S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, supra note 114, at 59, 124-25; N.Y.U. Note, supra note
17, at 593-95.
178. MiC. Note, supra note 1, at 1655.
179. Hellman, supra note 118, at 1011.
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tentially force judges to develop a consistent set of principles to govern the grant
or denial of en bane review. Surely the bland statement that the issue is "impor-
tant" will no longer be sufficient. If a principal restraint on judicial error is the
requirement of written decisions, then it should have a curative effect on unprin-
cipled use of the en bane process.18 0 Therefore, an explicit statement of reasons
to en bane should be required by circuit rule or suggested by the chief judge of
each circuit.
III. EN BANC DECISION MAKING IN THE REAGAN ERA
A. Purpose and Methodology
As we have seen, the contemporary concern with the en bane process is
driven by the asserted number of cases which are, but should not be, en banced,
and the claimed use or threat of the process by conservative judges. An exami-
nation of a sample of recent en bane decisions can empirically test both con-
cerns. Compiling the votes of Democratic and Republican appointed circuit
judges in each decision can determine if the Reagan appointees are reversing
liberal panel decisions. Likewise, subjecting these decisions to a set of criteria
explicating the demand of rule 35 can help determine which cases were, but
should not have been, en banced. The latter function can also be served by
examining unanimous en banc decisions, which would not reveal ideological
cleavage. Finally a review of opinions concurring in or dissenting from decisions
not to en bane a panel decision can shed light on judges' own criteria for invok-
ing the process.i
si
The sample for the present study consisted of all the published en banc
opinions rendered by the circuit courts from January 1, 1985, through Decem-
ber 31, 1987.182 One hundred eighty-three nonunanimous decisions, forty-one
unanimous en bane cases, and fifty-eight cases having opinions concurring in or
dissenting from decisions not to en bane a case comprise the sample. Certain
data was collected from each decision or opinion: the issue presented, the result
of the en bane decision, the President who appointed the en banc judges, the
judges' votes, Supreme Court disposition of the case (if any), and the length of
the en bane opinion. Finally, I reviewed each decision or opinion and applied
180. See Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 107 S. Ct. 1722, 1730-32 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); MICH. Note, supra note 1, at 1655.
181. Other measures of the functional and ideological concerns can be devised, such as examin-
ing whether the cases subject to litigants' suggestions for rehearing are worthy of en bane review, and
the votes thereon, but they are beyond the scope of this study.
182. The authors of the Columbia Note collected a sample of non-unanimous panel and en bane
decisions from 1985 to 1987, covering 752 F.2d to 807 F.2d. COLUM. Note, supra note 8, at 773-75.
I am grateful to the authors of that study for providing me with a list of the en bane decisions
covered. Letter from Timothy Tomasi and Jess Velona to Michael Solimine (Oct. 19, 1987) (on file
with author). In order to complete the sample described in the text, my research assistants and I
reexamined volumes 752 to 807, and carried the collection forward through 835 F.2d.
1985 was chosen as a base year for study because the Reagan-appointed judges only then started
to appear in significant numbers on the appellate courts. COLUM. Note, supra note 8, at 773 n.44.
In addition, unlike the Columbia study, I did not code en bane decisions from the Federal'Circuit,
since that court has never figured prominently in the current debate discussed in this Article.
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the criteria developed above for rule 35 to determine whether the case should
have been en banced.
The last inquiry is admittedly somewhat subjective in nature.183 For the
convenience of the reader, I attach an Appendix to this Article giving the cita-
tions of the decisions or opinions coded, the circuit of each, and my rating of the
case concerning its suitability to en bane review. Readers are invited to examine
the cases and reach their own conclusions.
B. Results
1. Ideology as a Predictive Variable
Table 4 presents the information derived from the nonmanimous en bane
cases in the sample. The data do not support the charge that the Reagan-ap-
pointed judges are using the en bane procedure as an ideological tool. Out of
183 cases, only nine show Reagan-appointed judges voting a straight appointive
line to overrule a liberal panel decision, with all Democratic-appointed judges
dissenting. 184 The vast majority of the cases-the remaining ones-involved
mixed voting patterns: majority and/or dissenting opinions consisting of Re-
publican and Democratic judges. Admittedly, of this subsample of 174 cases,
over half (100) did involve straight appointive line dissents. In other words the
dissents (but not the majority opinions) consisted solely of judges of one appoin-
tive party. There were 36 such Republican dissents and 64 such Democratic
dissents, though most involved just one to three dissenting judges.185 However,
when the 41 unanimous en bane cases are added to these figures, the data refute
the charge that the en bane process has become a vehicle for ideological voting.
A somewhat different picture is presented by the 58 cases in which en bane
183. This problem of rater bias is unavoidable, and would have been exacerbated by delegating
the task to research assistants. See S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, supra note 114, at 79-80 (discuss-
ing rater bias); Easterbrook, supra note 129, at 391-92 (perils of delegation)..
184. The nine cases are: Perry v. Leeke, 832 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1987) (en bane), cert. granted,
108 S. Ct. 1269 (1988); Doe v. United States, 821 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en bane); Teague v.
Lane, 820 F.2d 832 (7th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert granted, 108 S. Ct. 1106 (1988); Britton v. South
Bend Community School Corp., 819 F.2d 766 (7th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 288
(1987); Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 810 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en bane);
Hamilton v. Nix, 809 F.2d 463 (8th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3270 (1987); Jenkins by
Agyei v. State of Missouri, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986) (en bane), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 70 (1987);
Dixon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 800 F.2d 422 (4th Cir. 1986) (en bane); Perry v. F.B.I., 781 F.2d
1294 (7th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 814 (1986). One should note that the Fourth Circuit
Perry case was en banced without a prior panel decision, 781 F.2d 1294, and the Dixon case from the
same circuit involved two issues, only one of which was decided on straight-appointive lines. Dixon,
800 F2d 422.
Volumes 835 to 840 of the Federal Reporter (Second) contain 15 non-unanimous and one unan-
imous en bane decisions. Of these 16, two are the result of appointive line voting. In Wolfe v.
Department of Health & Human Serv., 839 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en bane), the majority was
made up of Reagan appointees while the dissenters had been appointed by Presidents Johnson and
Carter. In Burch v. Apalachee Community Mental Health Services, Inc., 840 F.2d 797 (1 1th Cir.
1988) (en bane), Democratic appointees constituted the majority while Republican appointees made
up the dissenters. The Burch decision is the only case discussed or listed in this article in which
Democratic appointees made up the majority in a straight appointive vote.
185. There were 73 cases in the sample which fell into this category. Of these, 26 involved a
single dissent (12 Republican; 14 Democratic); 27 involved 2 dissents (7 Republican; 20 Demo-




Non-Unanimous En Banc Decisions, 1985-1987
# of
Cases With Cert.c
Appointive Average Justified Granted Reasons
Circuit #a Line Votes Length Yes No Yes No Given
DC 8 8 29.8 4 4 1 3 1
First 3 2 13.0 1 2 0 2 1
Second 2 0 16.0 2 0 0 1 0
Third 15 2 18.8 3 12 3 6 5
Fourth 28 15 8.0 10 18 6 10 6
Fifth 25 14 16.0 13 12 8 11 7
Sixth 12 4 13.75 6 6 1 7 1
Seventh 11 5 15.7 3 8 3 3 1
Eighth 26 17 12.7 13 13 5 14 4
Ninth 12 7 15.3 5 7 2 5 3
Tenth 11 6 15.8 6 5 0 6 1
Eleventh 30 20 16.0 11 19 9 15 15
TOTALS 183 100 13 .10 b 77 106 38 83 45
.each opinion counted as one case
bweighted average
.cases in which review was sought; as of July 1988 (end of 1987 Supreme Court Term).
review was denied and which were accompanied by concurring or dissenting
opinions. Of this subsample, only 13 dissents involved a mix of Democratic- and
Republican-appointed judges; 31 consisted solely of GOP appointees, and 14
solely of Democratic appointees (see Table 5).
The data as a whole seem to refute the notion that en banc decision making
is driven solely by the ideology of the voting judges. If that hypothesis were
true, one would expect a far greater incidence of straight appointive line voting.
Indeed, the lack of evidence of widespread ideological voting is even more re-
markable in light of the numbers of Reagan-appointed judges on the circuits. At
the beginning of the sample, in April of 1985, only the Seventh Circuit consisted
of a majority of Reagan-appointed judges (although four other circuits consisted
of a majority of judges appointed by 6arlier Republican Presidents). By early
1987 four circuits consisted of Reagan majorities, while four others consisted of
Republican majorities. 186 Assuming that the Reagan- and earlier Republican-
186. This information is gathered from volumes 752 and 806, respectively, of Federal Reporter
(Second).
1988]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
appointed judges vote similarly,187 one predicting largely ideological voting
would expect a large number of straight appointive-line en bancs, rather than
only nine. One might also expect a sharp increase in the number of en bane
decisions, which, as we have seen, 188 is not the case.
On the other hand, the high incidence of apparent ideological voting on
opinions dissenting from en bane rehearing is somewhat inconsistent with the
balance of the sample. The deviation in this smaller sample might be explained
in a number of ways. Perhaps reflecting concerns over the propriety of publicly
registering such dissents at all, 18 9 the number of these opinions remains small
compared to the total number of en bane decisions and of litigant suggestions for
rehearing. The size of this subsample may magnify certain voting patterns.
Some judges of both appointive groups may simply be more willing to vent disa-
greement. 190 Any conclusions from this subsample must be drawn cautiously,
since circuit judges are not required to publicly register such dissents and, in-
deed, few judges do so. The votes that are public from all of the judges-those
on en bane decisions-are more indicative of the ideological posture of the cir-
cuit courts. By that measure, such posturing has not dominated en bane voting
in the Reagan era.
2. Suitability for En Bane Review
A second purpose for compiling the sample was to obtain some sense of
those cases to which courts have granted en bane review and to test these cases
against the criteria for rule 35 developed earlier in this Article: such as intracir-
cuit uniformity (to resolve genuine panel conflicts) and issues of exceptional im-
CIRCUIT COMPOSITION OF COURTS
Jan. 1985 Jan.
1987.
D.C. 3 Reagan judges out of 10 6 ofll
First 1 of 5(and 1 other Republican judge) 2 of 6(1)
Second 4 ofll(3) 7 of 13(2)
Third 1 of 10(5) 3 of 10(1)
Fourth 3 of 11(3) 3 ofll(3)
Fifth 5 of 14(1) 6 of 13(l)
Sixth 4 ofll(2) 8 of 15(2)
Seventh 5 of 9(2) 6 of 10(2)
Eighth 3 of 9(1) 5 ofl0(1)
Ninth 4 of 25(5) 8 of 26(5)
Tenth 0 of 5(1) 4 of 9(1)
Eleventh 0 of 12(4) 1 of 12(4)
187. See supra text accompanying notes 88-90.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69 & Tables I & 2.
189. Issacs v. Kemp, 782 F.2d 896, 897 n.l (11th Cir.) (Hill, J., dissenting from denial of rehear-
ing en bane) (advocating a "simple order reciting" the denial), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164 (1986);
Wald, The D.C Circuit: Here and Now, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 718, 719 (1987) ("the elaborate
statements by dissenting members when en bane is denied ... have been described, probably accu-
rately, as thinly disguised invitations to certiorari"). But see S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, supra
note 114, at 122 (calling for "publishing the Justices' votes on decisions to grant or deny review".).
190. See J. HOWARD, supra note 30, at 205; see also Brennan, In Defense of Dissent, 37 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 427 (1986) (concludes that dissenting opinions serve an important purpose); Easterbrook,
Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARv. L. REV. 802, 804-11 (1982) (discussing value of dissenting
opinions); Kelman, The Forked Path of Dissent, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 227, 248-58 (describing in-









Appointive Average Justified Granted
Ciucuit #a Line Votes Length Yes No Yes No
D.C. 10 9 5.2 4 6 2 3
First 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Second 2 1 2.5 1 1 1 2
Third 10 9 2.3 4 6 2 5
Fourth 1 1 6.0 0 .1 1 0
Fifth 9 6 3.0 4 5 2 3
Sixth 2 2 1.5 0 2 0 2
Seventh 4 4 4.5 3 1 1 1
Eighth 6 4 2.8 3 3 1 1
Ninth 10 8 6.0 3 7 2 1
Tenth 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Eleventh 4 4 2.6 0 4 1 2
TOTALS 58c 48 3.8 b  23 35 11 18
'each order denying rehearing en bane counted as one case, even if there was more than one dissent
or concurrence.
'weighted average; dissents only coded.
excludes four cases having only concurring opinion(s), and one case dissenting from granting of
rehearing en bane. See Appendix.
icases in which review was sought; as of July 1988 (end of 1987 Supreme Court Term).
portance (largely meaning regional importance or affecting many cases). The
author read each case in the sample and determined if en bane review was justi-
fied based on his application of these criteria. Although this classification was
both subjective and difficult, this type of effort is necessary to better understand
the en bane behavior of the circuit judges.1 91
Table 4 presents the relevant data from the nonunanimous sample of en
191. For a discussion and defense of the methodology of a similar survey, see S. ESTREICHER &
J. SEXTON, supra note 114, at 76-80.
Another method of evaluating the rationality of a decision to en bane a case would be to study
the citations to an en bane opinion. If the number of citations is one idicia of an opinion's preceden-
tial value then truly important en bane cases should be cited more often than non-justified en bane
decisions. See R. POSNER, supra note 60, at 510.
As a partial test of this theory, the author used SHEPARD'S FEDERAL CITATIONS (6th ed. Supp
1985-87, pt.2) to shepardize the earliest 20 cases coded as "justified," and the earliest 20 not coded as
"justified." See Appendix for a list of these cases. The results were that the mean average for the
justified cases was 19.6 citations, while the mean average for the unjustified category was 20.1 cita-
tions. These figures would seem to disprove the hypothesis until two "not justified" cases are fac-
tored out, each with an extraordinarily high number of citations: Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226
(8th Cir. 1985) (en bane), rev'd sub nom. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986) (163 citations)
(exclusion of certain jurors in death penalty case) and Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F. 2d 1383 (11th Cir.
1985) (en bane), vacated and remanded, 478 U.S. 1016 (1986) (92 citations) (jury instructions and
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banc cases. Over one-half of these cases were classified as not appropriate for en
bane review.192 No particular trend is apparent from the gross data. All cir-
cuits seem guilty of inappropriate voting for en bancs. Rather than laboriously
defending the classification scheme on an individual basis, the following
paragraphs will emphasize recurrent illustrations of the criteria at work, and
some cases that seem uniquely inappropriate for en banc review.
Many of the cases placed in the unjustified column seem little more than
exercises in "error correction" 193 or law development in narrow or esoteric ar-
eas. 194 One recurrent problem is that of an issue affecting only one state or even
one city. On its face such a case does not qualify for en banc review by the
"regional importance" criterion, but that determination is little comfort to the
residents of that state or city. Certainly, the importance of a case would seem to
increase as the size and population of the affected geographic area increases.
Reflecting a presumption that cases affecting only one state or city should not be
en banced (absent other reasons), most of the cases of this type were classified as
not justified. 195
prosecutor's comments on sentencing phase of death penalty case). The 18 remaining "not justified"
cases have a mean average citation rate of 8.1, considerably below that of the "justified" category.
192. Of the nine straight-appointive voting cases, see supra text accompanying note 184, the
author classified three as justified and six as not justified.
193. E-g., Aldridge v. Baltimore & 0. 1KR., 814 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (seemingly
routine case under the Federal Employers' Liability Act), vacated and remanded, 108 S. Ct. 2812
(1988); Holmes v. Bevilacqua, 794 F.2d 142 (4th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (seemingly routine case of
racial employment discrimination); Dracos v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 762 F.2d 348 (4th Cir.) (en bane)
(subject matter jurisdiction over suit by Greek plaintiff against Greek defendant), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 945 (1986); Martin v. Heckler, 773 F.2d 1145 (1lth Cir. 1985) (en bane) (seemingly routine
attorneys' fees case).
194. E.g., Bhandari v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 829 F.2d 1343 (5th Cir. 1987) (en bane)
(42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 and alien discrimination); United States v. Kozminski, 821 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir.
1987) (en banc) (elements of involuntary servitude of retarded workers), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 2751
(1988); Beisler v. Comm'r, 814 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (taxation of retired football
player's retirement benefits); Bissonette v. Haig, 800 F.2d 812 (8th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (application
of Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385, to private suit), aff'dper curiamfor lack of a quorum,
108 S. Ct. 1253 (1988); Friedman v. Board of County Comm'rs, 781 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1985) (en
banc) (whether a county's public use of latin cross and Spanish motto "With This We Conquer"
violated First Amendment), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986); Troy v. City of Hampton, 756 F.2d
1000 (4th Cir.) (en bane) (right to jury trial under Veterans Reemployment Rights Act), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 864 (1985); In re Grand Jury Matter (Gronowicz), 764 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1985) (en bane)
(subpoena of author of book), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986); cf. Jenkins v. Missouri, 807 F.2d
657 (8th Cir. 1986) (en bane) (school desegregation case classified as unjustified but arguably a con-
troversial case for which an authoritative statement is appropriate), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 70
(1987); see supra text accompanying notes 126-27.
195. Eg., Toombs v. Manning, 835 F.2d 453 (3d Cir. 1987) (en bane) (sovereign immunity
under Pennsylvania law in a diversity action); Leaman v. Ohio Dep't of Mental Retardation & De-
velopmental Disabilities, 825 F.2d 946 (6th Cir. 1987) (en bane) (interpretation of Ohio Court of
Claims Act), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 2844 (1988); Hill v. City of Houston, 789 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir.
1986) (en bane) (city ordinance prohibiting the opposing, molesting, or interrupting of a policeman,
with no indication that there were similar ordinances elsewhere), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 2502 (1987) ; First
Amendment Coalition v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd., 784 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1986) (en bane)
(Pennsylvania constitutional provision restricting access to review board records). Virtually all of
the numerous death penalty cases from the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits fell into this category, since
they involved the statutes or procedures of one state. See also supra notes 159-63 (certain circuits
tend to hear a higher proportion of certain types of cases). But see MeCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d
877 (11th Cir. 1985) (en bane) (death penalty case addressing proof to demonstrate racial bias in
sentencing; coded as justified), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 1756 reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct 3199 (1987).
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Other cases seemed entirely appropriate for en bane review. Many involved
procedural issues applicable to a wide spectrum of civil and criminal cases.
196
Other issues, such as those concerning the awarding of attorneys' fees and settle-
ments, also impact a wide variety of cases and are only now being fully devel-
oped in the case law. 197 Not every case having wide-ranging impact should
necessarily be en banced, but these types of cases seem generally to be appropri-
ate vehicles for the process.19 8 As the law addressed in these cases develops, en
bane treatment may become less appropriate. Still other cases involved genuine
issues of regional or subject-matter importance to the particular circuit, 199 or
196. !g., Litman v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 825 F.2d 1506 (11th Cir. 1987) (en bane)
(ability to waive right to new trial), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 700 (1988); United States v. Ford, 824
F.2d 1430 (5th Cir. 1987) (en bane) (ability of magistrate to preside over jury selection), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 741 (1988); In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, 821 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1987) (en
bane) (whether state or federal law of forum non conveniens applies in diversity cases); Stewart Org.,
Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (en bane) (whether state or federal
law controlled validity of contractual forum selection clauses), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988); Archie
v. Christian, 808 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1987) (en bane) (magistrate's power to conduct jury trial over
objection by defendant); Bryant v. Ford Motor Co., 832 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (effect
of "Doe" plaintiffs on citizenship in diversity cases); Henry v. City of Detroit Manpower Dep't, 763
F.2d 757 (6th Cir.) (en banc) (appealability of denial of appointment of counsel in Title VII case),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1036 (1985); see also Thomas v. Capital Sec. Services, Inc., 836 F.2d 866 (5th
Cir. 1988) (en bane) (construction of amended FED. R. CIv. P. 11).
197. On attorneys' fees, see, e.g., Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504 (10th Cir. 1987) (en banc)
(imposing sanctions on attorneys who initiate frivolous appeals); Nephew v. City of Aurora, 830
F.2d 1547 (10th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (awarding attorneys' fees to civil rights plaintiff who only
recovered nominal damages), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 1269 (1988); Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d
1069 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (en bane) (restrictions on filing by pro se plaintiff); Duncan v.
Poythress, 777 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1985) (en bane) (whether an attorney who is a pro se plaintiff
can recover attorney's fees), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1129 (1986); Kelly v. Metropolitan County Bd. of
Educ., 773 F.2d 677 (6th Cir. 1985) (en bane) (recovering attorneys' fees in civil rights case), cert
denied, 474 U.S. 1083 (1986). On settlement, see, e.g., Auer v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 830 F.2d
535 (4th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (whether state or federal law controls interpretation of release in
diversity action); cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1076 (1988); see also Solimine, Enforcement and Interpreta-
tion of Settlements of Federal Civil Rights Actions, 19 RUTGERs L.J. 295, 296-97 (1988) (over one-
half of federal civil actions end in consent decrees or settlement agreements).
198. The following cases were classified as "not justified": Skevofilax v. Quigley, 810 F.2d 378
(3d Cir.) (en bane) (jurisdiction over garnishment to enforce judgment), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1956
(1987); Runyan v. Nat'l Cash Register Corp., 787 F.2d 1039 (6th Cir.) (en bane) (validity of general
release in age discrimination case by lawyer-plaintiff; facts seem unique), cert denied, 478 U.S. 850
(1986); Little Rock School Dist. v. Pulaski County Special School, 787 F.2d 372 (8th Cir.) (en banc)
(fees for intervenors in school desegregation case; facts seem unique), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186
(1986); see also Martin v. Heckler, 773 F.2d 1145 (11 Cir. 1985) (en bane) (seemingly routine attor-
neys' fees case); cases cited supra note 193.
199. Kg., Arcoren v. Peters, 829 F.2d 671 (8th Cir. 1987) (en bane) (due process rights before
repossession of cattle), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1290 (1988); Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc.,
823 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir. 1987) (en bane) (preemption by federal labor law of state law retaliatory
discharge claim under collective bargaining agreement), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 1877 (1988); Jersey Central
Power & Light v. FERC, 810 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en bane) (whether FERC must hold
evidentiary hearings to determine if ordered rates are just and reasonable); Equilease Corp. v. M/V
Sampson, 793 F.2d 598 (5th Cir.) (en bane) (unpaid insurance premiums give rise to maritime liens
under Federal Maritime Lien Act), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 984 (1987); Stapleton v. Westmoreland
Coal Co., 785.F.2d 424 (4th Cir. 1986) (en bane) (clarification of Fourth Circuit law on black lung
claims), rev'd sub nom. Mullins Coal Co. V. Proctor, O.W.C.P., 108 S. Ct. 427 (1987); Church of
Scientology v. IRS., 792 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (en bane) (scope of Freedom of Information Act
disclosure), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 271 (1987); Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314 (5th
Cir. 1985) (en bane) (asbestos litigation not a proper area for creation of federal common law), cert.
denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986); Oman v. Johns-Manville Corp., 764 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.) (en bane)
(asbestos claims by shipyard workers not cognizable in admiralty), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 971 (1985).
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other recurring issues in oft litigated substantive areas.200
Tables 5 and 6 present virtually identical information from the subsamples
of unanimous en banc decisions and dissenting opinions from denials of rehear-
ing en banc. As with the nonunanimous cases, the number of justified en bancs
constituted less than one-half of the sample. Examples of classification from
each sample are found in the footnote.
201
Some may find this analysis unsatisfactory. In particular, some may accuse
it of underestimating the amount of law development taking place in my "not
justified" category. Others might argue that if these opinions were analyzed
more thoroughly then intracircuit or intercircuit conflicts would reveal them-
selves, or the "importance" of the issues would be clearer, and the number of
200. Eg., Nishiyama v. Dickson County, 814 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1987) (en bane) (scope of sub-
stantive due process violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d
893 (3d Cir.) (en bane) (application of Age Discrimination Act in Employment in discriminatory
discharge case), cert dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 26 (1987); Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1985)
(en bane) (various recurring issues in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suits); Carrier v. Hutto, 754 F.2d 520 (4th
Cir. 1985) (per euriam) (en bane) (habeas corpus cases involving attorney error), rev'd sub nom.
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
201. a) With regard to unanimous cases: Justified: United States v. Jackson, 825 F.2d 853 (5th
Cir. 1987) (en bane) (checkpoint as equivalent of a border search), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 711
(1988); Lirette v. N.L. Sperry Sun, Inc., 820 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1987) (en bane) (removal of Jones
Act claim to federal court); Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1987) (en
bane) (whether disparate impact or disparate treatment test applies to Title VII attack on subjective
employment criteria), cert granted, 108 S. Ct. 1293 (1988); United States v. Cruz-Valdez, 773 F.2d
1541 (11th Cir. 1985) (en bane) (sufficiency of evidence in seizure of drug-running vessel), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1049 (1986).
Not justified: Victorian v. Miller, 813 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1987) (en bane) (if violation of Food
Stamp Act is cognizable under § 1983; unique); Universidad Cent. De Bayamon v. NLRB, 793 F.2d
383 (1st Cir. 1986) (en bane) (jurisdiction of NLRB over private university in Puerto Rico; unique);
Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026 (9th Cir. 1985) (en bane) (malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983; not a recurring issue in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suits).
b) With regard to opinions accompanied by dissents from denial of rehearing en bane:
Justified: Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1985) (statute of limitations in
§§ 1981, 1983 suits), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 2617 (1987); Uviedo v. Steves Sash & Door Co., 760 F.2d 87
(5th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (definition of "prevailing party" for awarding attorneys' fees), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986).
Not justified: Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 813 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1986) (zoning ordinance and
"takings" clause; likely to be resolved by the Supreme Court), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1120 (1988);
Aguillard v. Edwards, 778 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1985) (state "creation theory" statute for schools;
unique), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987); Levine v. CMP Publications, 753 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1985)
(libel case).
As listed in the Appendix, I classified two of the three cases in the D.C. Circuit trilogy as "not
justified," Martin v. D.C. Metropolitan Police Dep't, 812 F.2d 1425 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (lack of direct
inconsistency between panel decisions) and U.S. v. Meyer, 810 F.2d 1242 (D.C. Cir 1987) (relatively
unique facts), vacated, 816 F.2d 695 (en bane), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1121 (1988), and Bartlett as
"justified." Bartlett ex rel Neuman v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1987). I agree with Judge
Silberman's reasons for not voting to en bane Martin v. D.C. Metropolitan Police Dep't, 812 F.2d
1425 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (lack of direct inconsistency between panel decisions) and U.S. v. Meyer, 810
F.2d 1242 (D.C. Cir 1987) (relatively unique facts), vacated, 816 F.2d 695 (en bane), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 1121 (1988). Bartlett, at 1246-47 (Silberman, J.). I side with the dissenter's view of
Bartlett ex rel Neuman v. Bowen, because in the D.C. Circuit "at least, it will have great impact on
benefits legislation. Indeed, it will probably draw claimants to litigate here." Bartlett, at 1248 (Bork,
Starr, Buckley, Williams & D. Ginsburg, JJ dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane). The latter
reasons are especially relevant for a circuit that spends much time on administrative law, in which




"not justified" cases would be much less than one-half of the current en banced
cases.
I This criticism is not without force, but its persuasive value is considerably
diminished by the failure of the decisions themselves to explain why en banc
treatment was necessary. The "importance" of a case is not always apparent to
readers of the opinions. Tables 4 and 6 indicate that only about one-third of the
opinions explicitly stated why the circuit was deciding the case en banc.20 2 As
argued in Part II of this Article, requiring judges to justify en banc review of a
panel decision, as litigants are required to do in their suggestions for en banc
rehearing, would be an appropriate restraining force on the indiscriminate use of
en banc review. 20 3 Had the sample of cases been more forthright in explaining
compliance with rule 35, then the "not justified" category may have been much
smaller. The failure to do so in the vast majority of opinions in the sample may
explain the relatively small percentage of "justified" cases.
2°4
Reasonable people can disagree over whether a particular case is worthy of
en banc treatment. Yet such reasonable disagreements do not destroy the utility
of the criteria discussed above or those that might be developed by others. Law-
yers and judges are ostensibly trained to apply principles of law to a wide variety
of factual situations. The same process applies to the interpretation and applica-
tion of rule 35. Viewed in this light the data reveal that all the circuit judges
need to take a harder look at the numbers and types of cases they select for en
banc review.
202. Particularly troubling for their lack of explanation were several cases from the sample, less
than one page each, that simply indicated that the en bane majority or dissent was adopting the
majority or dissenting opinion in the panel. See, eg., Warren v. Halstead Industries, Inc., 835 F.2d
535 (4th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (en bane), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 2872 (1988); Little Rock School
Dist. v. Pulaski Co. Special School, 787 F.2d 372 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1186
(1986); Zemonick v. Consolidation Coal Co., 796 F.2d 1546 (4th Cir. 1986) (en bane), cerL denied,
479 U.S. 1018 (1987); Bruester v. Bordenkercher, 767 F.2d 81 (4th Cir. 1985) (en bane).
203. See supra text accompanying notes 179-81.
204. Three other observations about the opinions in the sample deserve brief mention here.
First, the average length in pages (each partial page was counted as one) of the nonunanimous en
bane decisions was 13.1; leading the way with a 29.8 average was the D.C. Circuit. The average
number for the unanimous cases was 8.6 pages, and that for the opinions concurring in or dissenting
from a rehearing denial was 3.8 pages. These figures compare to the average length of published
panel opinions of 5.4 pages in the 1980s, although the D.C. Circuit was reported to be averaging over
13 pages in this period. R. POSNER, supra note 30, at 118. The time required to produce and
circulate these longer opinions reflects the burdens of the en bane process. Second, some critics of the
process have raised the prospect of equally-divided decisions. See MIcH. Note, supra note 1, at 1646
n.50. The sample revealed only nine cases (listed in the Appendix) that were evenly divided. This
small percentage of the total cases en banced seems to be a minor problem, not sufficient to affect a
judgment about the en bane process.
Last, Tables 4, 5, and 6 reveal the Supreme Court disposition of certiorari petitions from the
cases studied. Overall petitions were submitted in about one-third of the cases and about one-half of
these were granted. This rate is much higher than the 3% rate observed for all petitions to the
Court. See supra text accompanying note 118. This difference confirms historical evidence of en
bancs. J. HOWARD, supra note 30, at 67-68; N.Y.U. Note, supra note 17, at 591-92 & 746-49. If the
filing or granting of a certiorari petition is an indication of the case's "importance," to litigants or to
the Court, then the rates found in the sample might suggest that en bancs overall deal with more
important issues than the average appellate case. It may also suggest that all the en bancs should not
be so characterized. The low rate of certiorari filing and granting in unanimous cases perhaps con-
firms Judge Patricia Wald's observation that dissenting opinions are signals to the Supreme Court to
take the case. Wald, supra note 189, at 719.
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Table 6
Unanimous En Banc Decisions, 1985-1987
Cert.'
Average Justified Granted Reasons
Circuit #a Length Yes No Yes No Given
D.C. 2 12.0 1 1 0 0 1
First 2 6.0 0 2 1 0 0
Second 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Third 2 6.0 1 1 0 0 1
Fourth 1 5.0 0 1 0 0 0
Fifth 7 6.4 5 2 0 2 4
Sixth 2 11.5 1 1 0 1 0
Seventh 2 2.0 2 0 0 0 1
Eighth 2 9.0 0 2 0 0 0
Ninth 8 9.75 3 5 1 0 3
Tenth 5 9.5 2 3 1 1 4
Eleventh 8 10.1 3 5 2 3 5
TOTALS 41 8 .6b 18 23 5 8 20
'each opinion counted as one case
'weighted average
'cases in which review was sought; as of July 1988 (end of 1987 Supreme Court Term)
IV. CONCLUSION
The process of en bane decision making by the federal courts of appeals
constitutes a significant and prevalent problem for students of procedure on and
off the bench. Since en bancing began almost five decades ago, critics have ar-
gued that its concrete costs far outweigh its putative benefits. More recently the
en bane process has purportedly been used indiscriminately as an ideological
tool of circuit judges appointed by the Reagan Administration to reverse disfa-
vored panel decisions.
This Article has subjected these functional and ideological criticisms to
both a theoretical and empirical critique. The ideological criticism has some
merit; the usual process of delegating most authority to three-judge panels
would be greatly undermined by permitting judges to en bane merely to correct
errors, one of the functions of appellate review. However, en bancing some lim-
ited areas of law development, the other function of intermediate appellate
courts, is appropriate. The data set failed to show that Reagan-appointed judges
were consistently, or even often, voting in the way described. As for the func-
tional criticism, the total number of en bane decisions in this decade does not
seem inordinate, though it masks the burdens placed on judges and their staffs
wading through an increasing number of litigant suggestions for rehearing en
bane. The data set also demonstrated that judges of all political persuasions are
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guilty of en bancing not necessarily too many cases, but cases not deserving of
the treatment.
These modest concerns will be magnified if the circuit courts do not take it
upon themselves to channel constructively the en bane process. One of several
appropriate ways to do this would be to formulate and apply explicit principles
to en bane cases in a consistent manner. Generally, these principles should em-
phasize law development rather than mere error correction. Specifically, the
principles should focus on resolving intolerable intracircuit conflicts, significant
intercircuit conflicts, and cases involving issues that recur in a particular circuit
or will affect many other cases. Only then will federal judges be faithful to the
mandates of rule 35 and the process of en bane decision making.
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APPENDIX
1. Nonunanimous En Bane Decisions (Table 4)
Justified























































































































































































Citation Circuit Y=Yes N=No
789 F.2d 1244 7 N
789 1103 5 N
789 722 9 N
789 438 7 N
789 26 DC N
788 1300 8 Y
787 1039 6 N
787 372 8 N
785 424 4 Y
784 1479 11 N
784 467 3 N
784 299 8 N
783 541 5 Y
783 1296 5 Y
782 855 10 N
782 513 5 Y
782 416 3 N
781 1458 11 N
781 1294 7 N
781 792 10 Y
781 777 10 N
781 1067 5 Y
781 394 5 N
781 238 2 Y
780 475 5 N
780 1268 5 N
781 1102 4 N
779 1492 11 N
778 404 8 Y
777 628 11 Y
777 1508 11 Y
776 942 11 N
775 933 8 N
774 1495 11 Y
773 1528 11 Y
773 1479 8 Y
773 1145 11 N
773 1087 10 N
773 798 7 N
773 677 6 Y
773 488 3 N
772 1410 7 N
772 1078 3 N
772 982 1 Y
771 143 6 Y
770 1514 11 N
770 578 6 Y
Justified
Citation Circuit Y=Yes N=No
770 F.2d 57 6 N
769 1488 11 N
769 289 5 Y
768 525 3 Y
767 752 11 N
767 81 4 N
765 944 10 Y
765 412 4 N
764 1404 11 N
764 1400 11 N
764 983 3 N
764 558 9 N
764 224 4 Y
763 1560 7 Y
763 942 8 N
763 757 6 Y
763 1115 10 N
762 1496 11 N
762 1480 11 N
762 1383 11 N
762 1137 1 N
762 348 4 N
761 1348 9 Y
761 1227 8 Y
760 887 8 Y
760 590 5 N
759 1353 9 N
759 1171 4 N
759 327 4 Y
758 226 8 N
757 557 3 N
756 1483 11 N
756 1000 4 N
756 994 4 Y
756 323 4 N
754 1111 4 Y
754 520 4 Y
753 1499 9 N
753 877 11 Y
752 1515 11 Y
752 1293 8 N
752 1261 8 Y
752 1019 5 Y
752 903 3 Y
751 1008 9 N
750 1314 5 Y
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3. Dissents From Denials of Rehearings En Banc (Table 5)
Justified
Citation Circuit Y=Yes N=No
833 F.2d 1271 9 Y
833 250 11 N
827 23 7 Y
826 194 2 N
824 1240 DC 2N,1Y
817 1333 8 Y
815 1034 5 Y
813 198 9 N.
811 501 9 N
811 247 3 N
809 1449 4 N
809 584 9 Y
809 530 8 Y
808 1298 8 N
808 1063 5 N
807 1466 9 N
807 643 7 N
806 1122 DC N
806 1115 DC Y
806 642 6 N
805 484 4 N
798 632 3 N
797 580 8 N
797 256 5 Y
794 1016 5 N
794 388 8 Y
793 514 3 N
793 304 DC N
793 222 9 N
790 1355 9 N
789 1319 9 Y
783 42 3 N
Justified
Citation Circuit Y=Yes N=No
787 F.2d 1031 6 N
782 896 11 N
781 1550 11 N
781 1325 9 N
780 614 7 Y
779 1129 5 N
778 623 11 N
778 225 5 N
777 113 3 Y
776 166 7 Y
775 110 3 Y
769 1323 8 N
769 168 3 Y
768 503 3 N
765 1196 DC Y
763 1432 DC N
760 1330 DC Y
760 87 5 Y
759 489 5 Y
758 83 3 N
756 277 2 Y
753 1341 5 N
753 262 3 Y
752 694 DC N
Concurring Opinion(s) Only:
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4. Equally Divided En Banc Decisions
Citation Circuit
832 F. 2d 664 1
827 1498 11
822 642 7
795 22 4
783 476 4
764 1279 8
762 73 8
761 1259 8
758 143 4
